Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings
This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal landings. The incentive scheme uses fish stock size as the tax variable, and can be seen as an alternative to a control policy. Rough estimates from a simulation study suggest that the incentive scheme is potentially useful. The incentive scheme also has potential application as an instrument to the solution of by-catch and discard problems.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Niels Bohrs Vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg|
Phone: (+45) 6550 1000
Fax: (+45) 6550 1091
Web page: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ime
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
- Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 1999. "Regulation of Renewable Resources in Federal Systems: The Case of Fishery in th EU," Working Papers 3/99, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
- Boyce, John R., 1996. "An Economic Analysis of the Fisheries Bycatch Problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 314-336, November.
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
- Carsten Lynge Jensen, 1999. "A Critical Review of the Common Fisheries Policy," Working Papers 6/99, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Clark, Colin W. & Munro, Gordon R., 1975. "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: A simplified approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 92-106, December.
- Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
- Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ulla H. Oehlenschläger)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.