IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Regulation of Renewable Resources in Federal Systems: The Case of Fishery in th EU

  • Frank Jensen

    ()

    (Institute of Local Government Studies, Denmark)

  • Niels Vestergaard

    ()

    (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

The EU regulation of fisheries is decided in two levels. The level of the total allowable catch (TAC) for the most important species is decided every year by the Council of Minsters. The TACs are allocated to the Member States as quotas. The Member States determine who is going to harvest the quota. There is, however, an information problem associated with this structure. It does not take into account how efficient fishermen in different countries are. In this paper we model the information problem as an adverse selection problem and analyse an EU tax coupled to effort as an alternative to the TAC system. We work with the hypothesis that EU suffers from a fiscal illusion and includes tax revenue in the objective function in order to finance other, also inefficient, operations. Even in the light of these imperfections there are at least two reasons for recommending an EU tax. First, it can be used to correct part of the market failure associated with fishery. Second, it can be used to secure correct revealation of types in the light of asymmetric information.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sdu.dk/~/media/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Miljo/ime/wp/Jensen3.ashx
File Function: First version, 1999-07
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 3/99.

as
in new window

Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:3
Contact details of provider: Postal: Niels Bohrs Vej 9, 6700 Esbjerg
Phone: (+45) 6550 1000
Fax: (+45) 6550 1091
Web page: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/ime
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October.
  2. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
  3. Klibanoff, Peter & Morduch, Jonathan, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 223-47, April.
  4. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
  5. Farrell, Joseph, 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 113-29, Fall.
  6. Rob, Rafael, 1989. "Pollution claim settlements under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 307-333, April.
  7. Kwerel, Evan, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601, October.
  8. List, John A. & Gerking, Shelby D., 1996. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Pollution Control," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 26(1).
  9. Gordon R. Munro, 1996. "Approaches to the Economics of the Management of High Seas Fishery Resources: A Summary," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 157-64, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ulla H. Oehlenschläger)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.