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An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions

Author

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  • Juan Pablo Montero

    () (Instituto de Economía)

Abstract

Efficient regulation of the commons requires information about the regulated firms that is rarely available to regulators (e.g., cost of pollution abatement). Montero (2008) proposes a simple mechanism for inducing firms to truthfully reveal their privat

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo Montero, 2007. "An Auction Mechanism for the Commons: Some Extensions," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 44(130), pages 141-150.
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:44:y:2007:i:130:p:141-150
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    File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/130monta.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 857-860.
    3. Spulber, Daniel F., 1988. "Optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 163-181, March.
    4. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2008. "A Simple Auction Mechanism for the Optimal Allocation of the Commons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 496-518, March.
    5. Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
    6. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
    7. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Requate, Tilman & Camacho-Cuena, Eva & Ch'ng, Kean Siang & Waichman, Israel, 2018. "Tell the truth or not? The Montero mechanism for emissions control at work," Economics Working Papers 2018-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    2. Lars Gårn Hansen, 2015. "A Montero auction mechanism for regulating unobserved use of the commons," IFRO Working Paper 2015/07, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalities; asymmetric information; uniform-price auction;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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