IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits

  • Berglann, Helge
Registered author(s):

    This paper presents a simple system for efficient regulation under asymmetric information. Each firm's income is controlled by a tax that depends on the firm's own output and on a parameter construed as a share permit. These “shares of total expected output” lower a firm's tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By employing this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal damage to induce the first-best outcome. Relative to a traditional cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0095069612000411
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

    Volume (Year): 64 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 402-409

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:402-409
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Joanne Roberts, 1999. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," Working Papers jorob-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Nicholas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelsohn, 2009. "Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1714-39, December.
    3. Robert A. Collinge & Wallace E. Oates, 1982. "Efficiency in Pollution Control in the Short and Long Runs: A System of Rental Emission Permits," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(2), pages 347-54, May.
    4. Weitzman, Martin L, 1978. "Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 683-91, September.
    5. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2006. "A simple auction mechanism for the optimal allocation of the commons," Working Papers 0608, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
    6. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1997. "On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation," NBER Working Papers 6251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
    9. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    10. repec:oup:restud:v:47:y:1980:i:5:p:857-60 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, 1.
    12. Varian, H,R., 1991. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," Papers 10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    13. Unold, Wolfram & Requate, Till, 2001. "Pollution control by options trading," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 353-358, December.
    14. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
    15. Kim, Jae-Cheol & Chang, Ki-Bok, 1993. "An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 183-97, June.
    16. repec:oup:restud:v:41:y:1974:i:4:p:477-91 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-47, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:64:y:2012:i:3:p:402-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.