IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v40y2007i4p1286-1310.html

Envy, leisure, and restrictions on working hours

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado

Abstract

We present a simple model of capital accumulation where agents care about their consumption relative to the consumption of other members of society, `envy,' In this context we quantify the extent of the distortions and welfare costs associated with envy. Under conservative estimates of envy we find that the implied welfare losses are substantial. We explore the implications of alternative policy arrangements designed to minimize the effects of the consumption externality. Our results suggest that if the optimal tax policy is not politically feasible, restrictions on working hours provide an alternative tool to induce a market outcome that resembles the efficient allocation achieved under a benevolent central planner.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2007. "Envy, leisure, and restrictions on working hours," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1286-1310, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:4:p:1286-1310
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco & Van Long, Ngo, 2011. "The relative income hypothesis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 1489-1501, September.
    2. Fatma SAFI & Lobna Ben Hassen, 2021. "Subtractive versus Multiplicative Habits in Environmental Economics," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 72-90, March.
    3. Yan, Eric & Feng, Qu & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 2021. "Do we need ramsey taxation? Our existing taxes are largely corrective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 526-538.
    4. Chang, Juin-jen & Liu, Chia-ying & Wang, Wei-neng, 2018. "Conspicuous consumption and trade unionism," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 350-366.
    5. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado & Ngo Van Long, 2008. "A Permanent Income Version of the Relative Income Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 2361, CESifo.
    6. Sanou, Issa, 2024. "Consumption externalities, elastic labor supply and wealth distribution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    7. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado & Ngo Van Long, 2008. "Relative Consumption and Resource Extraction," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-27, CIRANO.
    8. Simone Valente, 2009. "International status seeking, trade, and growth leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(2), pages 554-589, May.
    9. Kenneth J. Arrow & Partha S. Dasgupta, 2009. "Conspicuous Consumption, Inconspicuous Leisure," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(541), pages 497-516, November.
    10. Tobias Koenig & Andreas Wagener, 2010. "Tax Structure and Government Expenditures under Tax Equity Norms," CESifo Working Paper Series 3205, CESifo.
    11. Curatola, Giuliano & Dergunov, Ilya, 2023. "International capital markets with interdependent preferences: Theory and empirical evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 403-421.
    12. Tim Friehe & Mario Mechtel & Markus Pannenberg, 2014. "Positional Income Concerns: Prevalence and Relationship with Personality and Economic Preferences," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201411, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    13. Goerke, Laszlo, 2013. "Profit sharing and relative consumption," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 167-169.
    14. Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2013. "Keeping up with the Joneses: Income Comparisons and Labour Supply," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 80033, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Koenig, Tobias & Wagener, Andreas, 2013. "Tax structure and government expenditures with tax equity concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 137-153.
    16. Goerke, Laszlo & Hillesheim, Inga, 2013. "Relative consumption, working time, and trade unions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 170-179.
    17. Vinod Mishra & Russell Smyth, 2012. "Work Hours in Chinese Enterprises: Evidence From Matched Employer-Employee Data," Monash Economics Working Papers 10-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    18. Malakhov, Sergey, 2013. "Эффект Веблена, Предельная Полезность Денег И Денежная Иллюзия [Veblen effect, marginal utility of money, and money illusion]," MPRA Paper 51014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Markus Knell, 2009. "The Work-and-Spend Cycle in a Globalized World," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 491-498.
    20. Goerke, Laszlo, 2013. "Relative consumption and tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 52-65.
    21. Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco & Van Long, Ngo, 2011. "Relative consumption and renewable resource extraction under alternative property-rights regimes," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 1028-1053.
    22. Sanou Issa, 2021. "Jealousy and Wealth Inequality: The Cases of Heterogeneous Preferences and Elastic Labor Supply," Working Papers hal-03408115, HAL.
    23. Pascal Courty & Merwan Engineer, 2019. "A pure hedonic theory of utility and status: Unhappy but efficient invidious comparisons," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(4), pages 601-621, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:40:y:2007:i:4:p:1286-1310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.