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Central clearing: trends and current issues

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Listed:
  • Dietrich Domanski
  • Leonardo Gambacorta
  • Cristina Picillo

Abstract

Central clearing of standardised financial instruments, as promoted by the G20 Leaders, addresses some of the financial stability risks that materialised during the Great Financial Crisis. Its rapid evolution since 2009 may have changed the linkages between central counterparties and the rest of the financial system. Against the backdrop of these trends, this article discusses how, and through which mechanisms, central clearing might have affected systemic risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietrich Domanski & Leonardo Gambacorta & Cristina Picillo, 2015. "Central clearing: trends and current issues," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:bisqtr:1512g
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Making Markets Safe: The Role of Central Clearing
      by Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz in Money, Banking and Financial Markets on 2016-03-28 17:33:05

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jaremski, Matthew, 2018. "The (dis)advantages of clearinghouses before the Fed," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 435-458.
    2. Gai, Prasanna & Kemp, Malcolm & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio & Schnabel, Isabel, 2019. "Regulatory complexity and the quest for robust regulation," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 8, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Bellia, Mario & Panzica, Roberto & Pelizzon, Loriana & Peltonen, Tuomas A., 2017. "The demand for central clearing: to clear or not to clear, that is the question," ESRB Working Paper Series 62, European Systemic Risk Board.
    4. Torsten Ehlers & Bryan Hardy, 2019. "The evolution of OTC interest rate derivatives markets," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    5. Ranaldo, Angelo & Schaffner, Patrick & Vasios, Michalis, 2019. "Regulatory effects on short-term interest rates," Bank of England working papers 801, Bank of England.
    6. Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 2018. "What Do We Know About the Effects of Macroprudential Policy?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 85(340), pages 735-770, October.
    7. Miglietta, Arianna & Picillo, Cristina & Pietrunti, Mario, 2019. "The impact of margin policies on the Italian repo market," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    8. Umar Faruqui & Wenqian Huang & Előd Takáts, 2018. "Clearing risks in OTC derivatives markets: the CCP-bank nexus," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    9. Dufour, Alfonso & Marra, Miriam & Sangiorgi, Ivan, 2019. "Determinants of intraday dynamics and collateral selection in centrally cleared and bilateral repos," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    10. Hitoshi Hayakawa, 2018. "Does a central clearing counterparty reduce liquidity needs?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(1), pages 9-50, April.
    11. Lopez, Claude & Saeidinezhad, Elham, 2017. "Central Counterparties Help, But Do Not Assure Financial Stability," MPRA Paper 80358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Pelizzon, Loriana, 2016. ""Predatory" margins and the regulation and supervision of central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs)," SAFE White Paper Series 41, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    13. H Peyton Young & Mark Paddrik, 2019. "How Safe are Central Counterparties in Credit Default Swap Markets?," Economics Series Working Papers 885, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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