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Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises

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  • Elena Carletti
  • Agnese Leonello

Abstract

We develop a model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and trade loans on the interbank market to deal with liquidity shocks. Two types of equilibria emerge, depending on the degree of credit market competition and the level of aggregate liquidity risk. In one equilibrium, all banks keep enough reserves and remain solvent. In the other, some banks default with positive probability. The latter equilibrium exists when competition is weak and large liquidity shocks are unlikely. The model delivers several implications concerning the relationship between competition, aggregate credit, and welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Carletti & Agnese Leonello, 2019. "Credit Market Competition and Liquidity Crises," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 23(5), pages 855-892.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:23:y:2019:i:5:p:855-892.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfy026
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    Cited by:

    1. Demian Macedo & Victor Troster, 2021. "Liquidity shocks and interbank market failures: the role of deposit flights, non-performing loans, and competition," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 705-746, October.
    2. Ahmad Peivandi & Mohammad Abbas Rezaei & Ajay Subramanian, 2023. "Optimal design of bank regulation under aggregate risk," Mathematics and Financial Economics, Springer, volume 17, number 2, June.
    3. Ronald Fischer & Nicolás Inostroza & Felipe J. Ramírez, 2013. "Banking Competition and Economic Stability," Documentos de Trabajo 296, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    4. Fernanda Cigainski Lisbinski & Heloisa Lee Burnquist, 2024. "Institutions and financial development: Comparative analysis of developed and developing economies," EconomiA, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 25(2), pages 347-376, May.
    5. Daniel Garrett & Ivan T. Ivanov, 2023. "Gas Guns and Governments: Financial Costs of Anti-ESG Policies," Working Paper Series WP 2023-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    6. Liu, Zehao & Yin, Xueyu & Tu, Haiyang & Zhang, Chengsi, 2025. "Bank competition and resilience to liquidity shocks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    7. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2024. "Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Carletti, Elena & Leonello, Agnese & Marquez, Robert, 2024. "Market power in banking," Working Paper Series 2886, European Central Bank.
    9. Fabio Castiglionesi, 2014. "Discussion of Hakenes and Schnabel," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 289-293, February.
    10. Ping-Lun Tseng & Wen-Chung Guo, 2022. "Fintech, Credit Market Competition, and Bank Asset Quality," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 285-318, June.
    11. Raja Almarzoqi & Sami Ben Naceur & Alessandro Scopelliti, 2015. "How Does Bank Competition Affect Solvency, Liquidity and Credit Risk? Evidence from the MENA Countries," IMF Working Papers 2015/210, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Jiahong Gao & Robert R. Reed, 2023. "Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 387-422, May.
    13. Lizethe Berenice Méndez-Heras & Francisco Venegas-Martínez & Diego Emilio Linthon-Delgado, 2021. "Competencia en el mercado de crédito entre los bancos dominantes en México," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 16(TNEA), pages 1-25, Septiembr.
    14. Gao, Jiahong & Reed, Robert R., 2021. "Sunspot bank runs and fragility: The role of financial sector competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    15. Christopher J Curfman & John Kandrac, 2022. "The Costs and Benefits of Liquidity Regulations: Lessons from an Idle Monetary Policy Tool [Crisis resolution and bank liquidity]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(2), pages 319-353.
    16. Ronald Fischer & Nicolás Inostroza & Felipe J. Ramírez, 2015. "Banking Competition and Economic Stability," Documentos de Trabajo 320, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    17. Toni Ahnert & David Martinez-Miera, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," Staff Working Papers 21-30, Bank of Canada.
    18. Matsuoka, Tarishi, 2018. "Banks and liquidity crises in emerging market economies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 43-62.
    19. Michiel Bijlsma & Andrei Dubovik & Gijsbert Zwart, 2012. "Inside Liquidity in Competitive Markets," CPB Discussion Paper 209, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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