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Is Pay-as-You-Drive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes?

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  • Ian W. H. Parry

Abstract

Gasoline taxes are widely perceived as the most efficient instrument for reducing gasoline consumption because they exploit all behavioral responses for reducing fuel use, including reduced driving and improved fuel economy. At present, however, higher fuel taxes are viewed as a political nonstarter. Pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) auto insurance, which involves replacing existing lump-sum premiums with premiums that vary in proportion to miles driven, should be more practical, since they do not raise driving costs for the average motorist. We show that when impacts on a broad range of motor vehicle externalities are considered, PAYD also induces significantly higher welfare gains than comparable gasoline tax increases, for fuel reductions below 9%. The reason is that under PAYD, all of the reduction in fuel use, rather than just a fraction, comes from reduced driving; this produces a substantial additional efficiency gain because mileage-related external costs (especially congestion and accidents) are relatively large in magnitude.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ian W. H. Parry, 2005. "Is Pay-as-You-Drive Insurance a Better Way to Reduce Gasoline than Gasoline Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 288-293, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:288-293
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282805774670482
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    Cited by:

    1. Hana Brůhová-Foltýnová, 2009. "Aplikace mikrosimulačních modelů v osobní dopravě: zkušenosti z ČR a zahraničí [Application of microsimulation models in passenger transport: results from the Czech republic and abroad]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2009(2), pages 194-212.
    2. Roel Verbelen & Katrien Antonio & Gerda Claeskens, 2018. "Unravelling the predictive power of telematics data in car insurance pricing," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series C, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1275-1304, November.
    3. Alois Geyer & Daniela Kremslehner & Alexander Muermann, 2020. "Asymmetric Information in Automobile Insurance: Evidence From Driving Behavior," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 87(4), pages 969-995, December.
    4. Imke Reimers & Benjamin R. Shiller, 2018. "Welfare Implications of Proprietary Data Collection: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance," Working Papers 119R, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School, revised May 2018.
    5. Santos, Georgina & Behrendt, Hannah & Maconi, Laura & Shirvani, Tara & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2010. "Part I: Externalities and economic policies in road transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 2-45.
    6. Saito Kuniyoshi & Kato Takaaki & Shimane Tetsuya, 2010. "Traffic Congestion and Accident Externality: A Japan-U.S. Comparison," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
    7. Michael L. Anderson & Maximilian Auffhammer, 2014. "Pounds That Kill: The External Costs of Vehicle Weight," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 535-571.
    8. Hultkrantz, Lars & Nilsson, Jan-Eric & Arvidsson, Sara, 2012. "Voluntary internalization of speeding externalities with vehicle insurance," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 926-937.
    9. Lucas W. Davis & James M. Sallee, 2020. "Should Electric Vehicle Drivers Pay a Mileage Tax?," Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(1), pages 65-94.
    10. Adam Śliwiński & Łukasz Kuryłowicz, 2021. "Usage‐based insurance and its acceptance: An empirical approach," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 71-91, March.
    11. Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, 2016. "The private (unnoticed) welfare cost of highway speeding behavior from time saving misperceptions," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 7, pages 24-37.
    12. Kremslehner, Daniela & Muermann, Alexander, 2016. "Asymmetric information in automobile insurance: Evidence from driving behavior," CFS Working Paper Series 543, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    13. Wu, Peng, 2019. "Which battery-charging technology and insurance contract is preferred in the electric vehicle sharing business?," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 537-548.
    14. Safoora Zarei & Ali R. Fallahi, 2019. "Pay-As-You-Drive Insurance Pricing Model," Papers 1912.09273, arXiv.org.
    15. André de Palma & Robin Lindsey, 2009. "Traffic Congestion Pricing Methods and Technologies," Working Papers hal-00414526, HAL.
    16. Mr. David Coady & Ian W.H. Parry & Louis Sears & Baoping Shang, 2015. "How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies?," IMF Working Papers 2015/105, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Kromer, Matthew A. & Bandivadekar, Anup & Evans, Christopher, 2010. "Long-term greenhouse gas emission and petroleum reduction goals: Evolutionary pathways for the light-duty vehicle sector," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 387-397.
    18. Greenberg, Allen, 2010. "Applying Behavioral Economics Concepts in Designing Usage-Based Car Insurance Products," 51st Annual Transportation Research Forum, Arlington, Virginia, March 11-13, 2010 207274, Transportation Research Forum.
    19. Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, 2020. "Why are highway speed limits really justified? An equilibrium speed choice analysis," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 317-351.
    20. Langer, Ashley & Maheshri, Vikram & Winston, Clifford, 2017. "From gallons to miles: A disaggregate analysis of automobile travel and externality taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 34-46.
    21. Miremad Soleymanian & Charles B. Weinberg & Ting Zhu, 2019. "Sensor Data and Behavioral Tracking: Does Usage-Based Auto Insurance Benefit Drivers?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 21-43, January.
    22. Welch, Timothy F. & Mishra, Sabyasachee, 2014. "A framework for determining road pricing revenue use and its welfare effects," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 61-70.
    23. Robin Lindsey, 2010. "Reforming Road User Charges: A Research Challenge For Regional Science," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 471-492, February.
    24. Imke Reimers & Benjamin R. Shiller, 2018. "Proprietary Data, Competition, and Consumer Effort: An Application to Telematics in Auto Insurance," Working Papers 119, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Business School.
    25. David Anthoff & Robert Hahn, 2010. "Government failure and market failure: on the inefficiency of environmental and energy policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 26(2), pages 197-224, Summer.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy

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