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Traffic Congestion and Accident Externality: A Japan-U.S. Comparison

Author

Listed:
  • Saito Kuniyoshi

    (Tezukayama University)

  • Kato Takaaki

    (University of Kitakyushu)

  • Shimane Tetsuya

    (Tokyo Institute of Technology)

Abstract

We measure the accident externality from driving in the spirit of Edlin and Karaca-Mandic (2006). We collect data that parallel those used in Edlin and Karaca-Mandic and apply their empirical method to gain further insights about the accident externality. Consistent with Edlin and Karaca-Mandic, we find larger external costs for higher density roads, although the sizes largely depend on the variable definition and the model specification. One intriguing result is that per-vehicle external costs are considerably smaller in Japan than those in the U.S. In Kyoto, for example, an additional driver increases accident costs for other drivers by $248--$802, while it is $1,725--$2,432 in California where the traffic density is approximately the same. However, on a per-mile basis, much closer externalities are obtained. This finding indicates that the large externality in high-density roads underscored in Edlin and Karaca-Mandic is partly attributed to the fact that U.S. drivers drive longer distances, comparatively speaking.

Suggested Citation

  • Saito Kuniyoshi & Kato Takaaki & Shimane Tetsuya, 2010. "Traffic Congestion and Accident Externality: A Japan-U.S. Comparison," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:14
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2057
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Piera Bello, 2021. "The environmental cost and the accident externality of driving: Evidence from the Swiss franc's appreciation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1440-1458, July.

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