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Citations for "Heterogeneity, Tournaments, and Hierarchies"

by Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Guasch, J Luis

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  1. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
  2. Hvide, Hans K. & Kristiansen, Eirik G., 2003. "Risk taking in selection contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 172-179, January.
  3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:41:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Gadi Barlevy & Derek Neal, 2009. "Pay for percentile," Working Paper Series WP-09-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
  6. Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk, 2002. "Envy and Compassion in Tournaments," IZA Discussion Papers 647, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Dirk Sliwka, 2006. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 523-547, October.
  8. Amegashie, J.A. & Wu, X., 2004. "Self Selection in Competing All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 2004-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  9. Gürtler, Oliver & Kräkel, Matthias, 2010. "Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 180-191, August.
  10. Golman, Russell & Bhatia, Sudeep, 2012. "Performance evaluation inflation and compression," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 534-543.
  11. Kräkel, Matthias & Schöttner, Anja, 2012. "Internal labor markets and worker rents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 491-509.
  12. Herbertz, Claus & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013. "When higher prizes lead to lower efforts—The impact of favoritism in tournaments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 188-191.
  13. Vandegrift, Donald & Brown, Paul, 2005. "Gender differences in the use of high-variance strategies in tournament competition," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 834-849, December.
  14. Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2010. "Difference in Interim Performance and Risk Taking with Short-Sale Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 8072, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2009. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," NBER Working Papers 15136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Spence, A. Michael, 2001. "Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2001-6, Nobel Prize Committee.
  17. Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1988. "Institutional aspects of credit cooperatives," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7, The World Bank.
  18. Barrett, Christopher B. & Bailey, DeeVon, 1999. "Are Agricultural Experiment Station Faculty Salaries Competitively Or Monopsonistically Determined?," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 28(1), April.
  19. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2010. "Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 743-752, February.
  20. Riis, Christian, 2008. "Efficient Contests," MPRA Paper 10906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Donald Vandegrift & Abdullah Yavas & Paul Brown, 2007. "Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 345-368, December.
  22. Vandegrift, Donald & Brown, Paul, 2003. "Task difficulty, incentive effects, and the selection of high-variance strategies: an experimental examination of tournament behavior," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 481-497, August.
  23. M'Hand Fares & Luis Orozco, 2014. "Tournament Mechanism in Wine-Grape Contracts: Evidence from a French Wine Cooperative," Post-Print hal-01093245, HAL.
  24. Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum 27/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  25. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2010. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 893-922, October.
  26. James W. Bono, 2008. "Sales contests, promotion decisions and heterogeneous risk," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 371-382.
  27. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  28. Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Kosmas Marinakis, 2007. "Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(41), pages 1-9.
  29. Butter, F.A.G. den & Gameren, E. van, 1998. "Labour flows in a simulation model of the firm," Serie Research Memoranda 0034, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
  30. Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1989. "Rural credit in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 219, The World Bank.
  31. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24639, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
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