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Citations for "Are Contributions Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees"

by Stratmann, Thomas

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  1. Matilde Bombardini & Francesco Trebbi, 2007. "Votes or Money? Theory and Evidence from the US Congress," Working Paper Series 21-07, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, revised Jul 2007.
  2. John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," NBER Working Papers 8981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
  4. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2000. "Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters," NBER Working Papers 7984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco Aparicio-Castillo, 2007. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 107-110, October.
  6. Hauer, Grant & Runge, C. Ford, 2000. "Transboundary Pollution And The Kuznet'S Curve In The Global Commons," Working Papers 14423, University of Minnesota, Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy.
  7. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
  8. Franklin Mixon & Chena Crocker & H. Black, 2005. "Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 477-493, June.
  9. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  10. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
  11. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
  12. Per Fredriksson, 2001. "How Pollution Taxes may Increase Pollution and Reduce Net Revenues," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 65-85, April.
  13. Franklin Mixon & Rand Ressler & M. Gibson, 2009. "False advertising and experience goods: the case of political services in the U.S. senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 83-95, January.
  14. John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 201102, Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
  15. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
  16. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2013. "Quantifying parliamentary representation of constituents’ preferences with quasi-experimental data," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 170-180.
  17. Paul Heaton, 2005. "Oil for What?—Illicit Iraqi Oil Contracts and the U.N. Security Council," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 193-206, Fall.
  18. Richard Damania & Per Fredriksson & Thomas Osang, 2004. "Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 279-308, February.
  19. Brooks, Jonathan, 1997. "Congressional Voting On Farm Payment Limitations: Political Pressure Of Ideological Conviction?," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 22(02), December.
  20. Stadelmann, David & Portmann, Marco & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2014. "The law of large districts: How district magnitude affects the quality of political representation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 128-140.
  21. Stuart A. Gabriel & Matthew E. Kahn & Ryan K. Vaughn, 2013. "Congressional Influence as a Determinant of Subprime Lending," NBER Working Papers 18965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Alexander Fink & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints," CESifo Working Paper Series 2827, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Bonnie Wilson & Dennis Coates, 2007. "Interest Group Activity and Long-Run Stock Market Performance," Working Papers 2007-02, Saint Louis University, Department of Economics.
  24. Mariano Tommasi & Matias Iaryczower & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law, Constitutional Interpretation. Argentina 1935-1998," Working Papers 73, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jun 2004.
  25. John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December.
  26. Elias Asproudis, 2011. "Revisiting environmental groups and members’ behaviour: budget, size and (im)pure altruism," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(2), pages 139-156, June.
  27. John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, 2000. "The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission," NBER Working Papers 7726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  28. Bond, Craig A. & Hoag, Dana L. & Freeborn, Jennifer & Van Doren, Terry, 2008. "Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers 108718, Colorado State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
  29. De Figueiredo, John M. & De Figueiredo, Rui J. P. Jr., 2002. "The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation," Working papers 4247-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  30. Christopher Magee, 2000. "Why Do Political Action Committees Give Money to Candidates? Campaign Contributions, Policy Choices, and Election Outcomes," Macroeconomics 0004038, EconWPA.
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