PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension
This paper expands the investigation of how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior to the U.S. House of Representative. Using a theoretical framework which draws on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Representative’s voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downsian view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. These results are consistent with earlier findings that investigate Senate behavior.
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- Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-73, October.
- Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-84, October.
- Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
- Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
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