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Citations for "The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard"

by Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz

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  1. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, 1998. "Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey," CIRANO Working Papers 98s-04, CIRANO.
  2. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen, 2007. "The Fetters of the Sib: Weber Meets Darwin," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 682, Stockholm School of Economics.
  3. Smith, Vincent H. & Chouinard, Hayley H. & Baquet, Alan E., 1994. "Almost Ideal Area Yield Crop Insurance Contracts," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 23(1), April.
  4. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Discussion Papers 0203-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  5. Hagen, Kare P. & Sannarnes, Jan Gaute, 2007. "Taxation of uncertain business profits, private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1507-1517, August.
  6. Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2007. "On the positive correlation property in competitive insurance markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 597-605, June.
  7. Bems, Rudolfs & Jönsson, Kristian, 2002. "Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets and the Optimal Bailout Policy," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 520, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 31 Oct 2003.
  8. Martin Hellwig, 2004. "Nonlinear Incentive Provision in Walrasian Markets: A Cournot Convergence Approach," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2004_8, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  9. Acharya, Viral & Almeida, Heitor & Ippolito, Filippo & Perez, Ander, 2014. "Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 287-319.
  10. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/4422 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Richard J. Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Dysfunctional Non-Market Institutions and the Market," NBER Working Papers 2666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
  13. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism," Carleton Economic Papers 07-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2008.
  14. Luca Panaccione & Catarina Goulão, 2015. "Pooling promises with moral hazard," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 460-465.
  15. Valentino Dardanoni & Paolo Li Donni, 2012. "Incentive and Selection Effects of Medigap Insurance on Inpatient Care," EIEF Working Papers Series 1203, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Feb 2012.
  16. Richard Arnott & Chong-en Bai & Brian Sack, 1996. "Latent Policies: An Extended Example," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 353., Boston College Department of Economics.
  17. Jack, William, 2002. "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 251-278, May.
  18. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  19. Sally Kane & Jason Shogren, 2000. "Linking Adaptation and Mitigation in Climate Change Policy," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 75-102, April.
  20. Gao, Feng & Powers, Michael R. & Wang, Jun, 2009. "Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China's health-insurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 505-510, June.
  21. Frédéric Loss & Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Linear Prices Equilibria and Nonexclusive Insurance Market," Working Papers 2014-042, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  22. Kaplow, Louis, 1992. " Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(4), pages 525-41.
  23. Hans H. Glismann & Klaus Schrader, 2001. "Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Kiel Working Papers 1052, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  24. Alberto Bennardo & P.A. Chiappori, 2002. "Bertrand and Walras equilibria under moral hazard," CSEF Working Papers 87, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  25. Bruno Cesar Aurichio Ledo, 2011. "Competição Em Preços Entre Corretores Deseguros De Automóveis," Anais do XXXVIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 38th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 045, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  26. Frédéric Gannon & Vincent Touze, 2007. "Insurance and Optimal Growth," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/4422, Sciences Po.
  27. Kostas Koufopoulos, 2002. "Asymmetric information, heterogeneity in risk perceptions and insurance: an explanation to a puzzle," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24906, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  28. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2013. "Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 19317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Stiglitz Joseph E., 2010. "Contagion, Liberalization, and the Optimal Structure of Globalization," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-47, December.
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