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Credit Lines as Monitored Liquidity Insurance: Theory and Evidence

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  • Heitor Almeida

    (University of Illinois)

  • Filippo Ippolito

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

  • Ander Perez

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

  • Viral Acharya

    (New York University)

Abstract

Recent empirical and survey evidence on corporate liquidity management suggests that bank credit lines do not offer fully committed liquidity insurance, and that they are frequently used to finance future growth opportunities rather than for precautionary motives. In this paper, we propose and test a theory of corporate liquidity management that is consistent with these findings. We argue that a corporate credit line can be understood as a form of monitored liquidity insurance, which controls illiquidity-seeking behavior by firms through bank monitoring and credit line revocation. In addition, we allow firms to demand liquidity not to hedge against negative liquidity shocks, but to help finance future growth opportunities. We show that bank monitoring and credit line revocation play less of a role for such firms, because the nature of their liquidity demand reduces their incentives to engage in illiquidity-seeking behavior. Thus, firms that have low hedging-needs (e.g., high correlation between cash flows and investment opportunities) can access fully committed credit lines that dominate cash holdings as an optimal liquidity management tool. We use a novel dataset on corporate credit lines to provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the model. The evidence suggests that credit line users have lower liquidity risk than firms that use cash for liquidity management. In addition, firms with low hedging-needs are more likely to use credit lines for liquidity management. Credit line covenants and covenant violations are less common when the credit line user has low hedging needs.

Suggested Citation

  • Heitor Almeida & Filippo Ippolito & Ander Perez & Viral Acharya, 2012. "Credit Lines as Monitored Liquidity Insurance: Theory and Evidence," 2012 Meeting Papers 823, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed012:823
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    Cited by:

    1. Berrospide, Jose M. & Meisenzahl, Ralf R., 2015. "The Real Effects of Credit Line Drawdowns," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-7, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Ippolito, Filippo & Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2016. "Double bank runs and liquidity risk management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, pages 135-154.
    3. Martin, Xiumin & Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2015. "Do financial market developments influence accounting practices? Credit default swaps and borrowers׳ reporting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, pages 80-104.
    4. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2013. "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants," CEIS Research Paper 261, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Aug 2014.
    5. Ruprecht, Benedikt & Entrop, Oliver & Kick, Thomas & Wilkens, Marco, 2013. "Market timing, maturity mismatch, and risk management: Evidence from the banking industry," Discussion Papers 56/2013, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Kapetanios, George & Marcellino, Massimiliano & Venditti, Fabrizio, 2016. "Large Time-Varying Parameter VARs: A Non-Parametric Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 11560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Tatyana Marchuk & Christian Schlag & Mariano Croce, 2017. "The Leading Premium," 2017 Meeting Papers 1251, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit default swaps and corporate cash holdings," CFS Working Paper Series 462, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    9. Berlin, Mitchell & Nini, Gregory P. & Yu, Edison, 2017. "Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates," Working Papers 17-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    10. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Igor Cunha & Michael S. Weisbach, 2014. "Corporate Liquidity Management: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 135-162, December.
    11. Shenoy, Jaideep & Williams, Ryan, 2017. "Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, pages 68-80.
    12. Acharya, Viral & Almeida, Heitor & Ippolito, Filippo & Perez, Ander, 2014. "Bank lines of credit as contingent liquidity: A study of covenant violations and their implications," Working Paper Series 1702, European Central Bank.
    13. Acharya, Viral V & Eisert, Tim & Eufinger, Christian & Hirsch, Christian, 2014. "Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," CEPR Discussion Papers 10108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. repec:eee:intfin:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:219-234 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Konstantins Benkovskis & Benjamin Bluhm & Elena Bobeica & Chiara Osbat & Stefan Zeugner, 2017. "What drives export market shares? It depends! An empirical analysis using Bayesian Model Averaging," Working Papers 2017/02, Latvijas Banka.

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    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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