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Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung

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  • Glismann, Hans H.
  • Schrader, Klaus

Abstract

The paper is about the economically efficient design of financial transfers to the unemployed in a highly industrialized country. There have been quite a few contributions to this problem — for example by Beenstock/Brasse, Feldstein/ Altman, Grubel, Orzag/Snower — which are presented and discussed. It turns out that a true unemployment insurance would be the most efficient way to solve the transfer problem. The second part of the paper deals with often-raised objections against such a solution. For example, insurability is often denied on the ground that an unemployment insurance would be too expensive due to moral hazard and adverse selection. It is shown that neither moral hazard nor adverse selection are insurmountable obstacles to a private insurance market.

Suggested Citation

  • Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Optionen einer effizienten Gestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Kiel Working Papers 1052, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael G Faure, 1995. "The Limits to Insurability from a Law and Economics Perspective," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 20(4), pages 454-462, October.
    2. Hartmann, Philipp, 1998. "Grenzen der Versicherbarkeit: private Arbeitslosenversicherung," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 6934, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. Snower, Dennis J, 1994. "Converting Unemployment Benefits into Employment Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 65-70, May.
    5. Arnott, Richard J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. " The Basic Analytics of Moral Hazard," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(3), pages 383-413.
    6. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2000. "Zur Reform der deutschen Arbeitslosenversicherung: Probleme und Lösungsansätze in der deutschen Literatur," Kiel Working Papers 995, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2001. "Alternative Systeme der Arbeitslosenversicherung: das Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten und des Vereinigten Königreichs," Kiel Working Papers 1032, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    2. Glismann, Hans H. & Schrader, Klaus, 2003. "Zur Einführung privater Arbeitslosenversicherungen in Deutschland," Kiel Working Papers 1144, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.
    4. Sesselmeier, Werner & Somaggio, Gabriele & Yollu, Aysel, 2006. "Mögliche Implikationen der gegenwärtigen Arbeitsmarktreformen für die zukünftige Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenversicherung," Arbeitspapiere 126, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf.
    5. von Berchem, Sascha & Berthold, Norbert, 2004. "Reform der Arbeitslosenversicherung: Markt, Staat oder beides?," Discussion Paper Series 70, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    6. Rürup, Bert, 2005. "Arbeitslosenversicherung: Staatlich, privat oder gemischt? (Unemployment insurance * state-run, private or a combination of both?)," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 38(2/3), pages 373-382.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Versicherungsökonomik; moral hazard; adverse selection; Arbeitslosenversicherung;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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