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Citations for "Comparative Cheap Talk"

by Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh

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  1. Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2007. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200801, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Oct 2008.
  2. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezso, 2014. "Smooth, strategic communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 10190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Ostrovsky, Michael & Schwarz, Michael, 2007. "Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets," Research Papers 1965, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. Rick Harbaugh & Eric Rasmusen, 2012. "Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information," Working Papers 2012-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  5. Persson, Petra, 2013. "Attention Manipulation and Information Overload," Working Paper Series 995, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  6. Benoît S.Y. Crutzen & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2007. "Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-040/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
  8. Sobel, Joel, 2013. "Ten possible experiments on communication and deception," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 408-413.
  9. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, 08.
  10. David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
  11. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2006. "Credible Ratings," Working Papers tecipa-219, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  12. Frankel, Alexander, 2016. "Discounted quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 396-444.
  13. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  14. Antonio Miralles, 2010. "Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 523-538, March.
  15. Frédéric Koessler & David Martimort, 2012. "Optimal Delegation with Multi-dimensional Decisions," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754576, HAL.
  16. Kovác, Eugen & Mylovanov, Tymofiy, 2009. "Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1373-1395, July.
  17. Wonsuk Chung & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Biased Recommendations," Working Papers 2012-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  18. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2013. "Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning," Working Papers 479, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  19. Péter Eső & Ádám Galambos, 2013. "Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 263-282, February.
  20. Jurjen J.A. Kamphorst & Otto H. Swank, 2014. "Don't demotivate, discriminate," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-017/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  21. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  22. Eric Schmidbauer, 2016. "Multi-period competitive cheap talk with very biased experts," Working Papers 2016-04, University of Central Florida, Department of Economics.
  23. Casella, Alessandra, 2011. "Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 46-76, May.
  24. Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 114-144.
  25. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Jindapon, Paan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2013. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 111-125.
  27. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2012. "Persuasive Puffery," Working Papers 2012-05, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  28. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
  29. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
  30. Gordon Rausser & Leo Simon & Jinhua Zhao, 2015. "Rational exaggeration and counter-exaggeration in information aggregation games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 109-146, May.
  31. Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezso, 2015. "Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations," CEPR Discussion Papers 10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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