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Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

    (Department of Economics and Finance, Universidad de Guanajuato)

Abstract

This paper develops a model of costly information acquisition by agents who are connected through a network. For a exogenously given network, each agent decides fi rst on information acquisition from his neighbors and then, after processing the information acquired, takes an action. Each agent is concerned about the extent to which other agents align their actions with the underlying state. A new equilibrium notion, which is in the spirit of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, is proposed to analyze information acquisition decisions within networked groups. This equilibrium notion allows each agent to compute, when deciding about information acquisition, the extent to which changes in his information acquisition decision will a ffect his own perception of future expected payo s. Agents anticipate and incorporate such changes in their information acquisition decisions. Both the efficient and the equilibrium information acquisition pro les are characterized and the compatibility between them is related to the density of the network.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2007. "Strategic Information Acquisition in Networked Groups with "Informational Spillovers"," Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers EC200801, Universidad de Guanajuato, Department of Economics and Finance, revised Oct 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:gua:wpaper:ec200801
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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