Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
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Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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- Martin Pesendorfer, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411.
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1698r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 2005. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 508-518, March.
- Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003.
"Private Monitoring in Auctions,"
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SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004.
"Comparative Cheap Talk,"
2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Miralles, Antonio, 2008. "Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 448-455, November.
- Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 228-259, October.
- Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 407-436.
- Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
- Mark Armstrong, 2000. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 455-481.
- Veronika Grimm & Frank Riedel & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001.
"Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
506, CESifo Group Munich.
- Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2003. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1557-1569, December.
- Grimm, Veronika & Riedel, Frank & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2001. "Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2001,31, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
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