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Dynamic Coordiantion Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Another Perspective on Planned obsolescence: is there really too much Innovation?," Industrial Organization 0302001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Maoliang Ye & Jie Zheng & Plamen Nikolov & Sam Asher, 2020. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(1), pages 113-129, January.
  3. Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar, 2008. "Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 302-330, November.
  4. Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games," Discussion Papers 68, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  5. Kováč, Eugen & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 298-320.
  6. Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
  7. Martin Chalkley & In Ho Lee, 1998. "Learning and Asymmetric Business Cycles," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 623-645, July.
  8. Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Information aggregation and investment cycles with strategic complementarity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 281-311, May.
  9. Francois, Patrick & Shi, Shouyong, 1999. "Innovation, Growth, and Welfare-Improving Cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 226-257, April.
  10. Dengwei Qi, 2022. "Learning and Strategic Delay in a Dynamic Coordination Game," KIER Working Papers 1087, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  11. Jay Surti, 2004. "Rational Speculation, Financial Crises, and Optimal Policy Responses," IMF Working Papers 2004/025, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August.
  13. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2012. "Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 97-116.
  14. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 7, pages 253-262, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  15. Tatsuhiro Shichijo & Emiko Fukuda, 2019. "A dynamic game analysis of Internet services with network externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 361-388, May.
  16. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2013. "Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 77-89.
  17. Steven A. Matthews, 2008. "Achievable Outcomes of Dynamic Contribution Games, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Jun 2011.
  18. Chamley, Christophe & Pinto, Brian, 2012. "Sovereign bailouts and senior loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6181, The World Bank.
  19. Gale, Douglas, 2001. "Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 295-320, November.
  20. Francois, Patrick & Shi, Shouyong, 1999. "Innovation, Growth, and Welfare-Improving Cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 226-257, April.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Ascending Auction: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000845, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. , A., 2013. "Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
  23. Zhen Zhou & Deepal Basak, 2015. "Diffusing Coordination Risk," 2015 Meeting Papers 1350, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  24. Margaria, Chiara, 2020. "Learning and payoff externalities in an investment game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 234-250.
  25. Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Innovation in a generalized timing game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 23-33.
  26. Juan Ruiz, 2003. "Machine replacement, Network Externalities and Investment Cycles," Macroeconomics 0302001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  27. Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November.
  28. Choi, Syngjoo & Gale, Douglas & Kariv, Shachar & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Network architecture, salience and coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 76-90, September.
  29. Shichijo Tatsuhiro & Nakayama Yuji, 2009. "A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-20, February.
  30. Masaki Aoyagi, 2010. "Monopoly Sale of a Network Good," ISER Discussion Paper 0794, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  31. Steven A. Matthews, 2006. "Smooth Monotone Contribution Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  32. Steiner, Jakub, 2008. "Coordination cycles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 308-327, May.
  33. Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2012. "Dynamic coordination with individual learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 83-101.
  34. Tatsuhiro SHICHIJO & Yuji NAKAYAMA, 2004. "A Way To Sell Goods With Network Externalities," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 711, Econometric Society.
  35. Dasgupta, Amil, 2007. "Coordination and delay in global games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 195-225, May.
  36. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
  37. Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
  38. Park In-Uck, 2004. "A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-26, June.
  39. Garratt, Rod & Keister, Todd, 2009. "Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 300-317, August.
  40. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Independent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1600, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2007.
  41. Christophe Chamley, 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 603-621, June.
  42. Christophe Chamley & Brian Pinto, 2012. "Sovereign Bailouts and Senior Loans," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2012, pages 269-291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Robert Kurzban & Mary Rigdon & Bart Wilson, 2008. "Incremental approaches to establishing trust," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(4), pages 370-389, December.
  44. Gallier, Carlo & Sturm, Bodo, 2021. "The ratchet effect in social dilemmas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 251-268.
  45. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Dynamic Auctions: Uniqueness and Robustness to Private Information," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000771, UCLA Department of Economics.
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