A Way To Sell Goods With Network Externalities
There are a lot of goods which have network externalities. While the number of players who have such a good is small, they may not get enough utility from the goods. That is, players have an incentive to delay their decision, when they purchase the goods with network externalities. Delay causes negative effects on players' utility, so equilibrium with delay is inefficient. We propose a way to settle this problem using a kind of call option. If we use the way and some conditions are satisfied, all players purchase the good and the delay decreases in equilibrium
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