On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
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More about this item
Keywordsdynamic games; Markov perfect equilibrium;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-03-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-03-08 (Microeconomics)
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