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Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games


  • Borgers, Tilman


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  • Borgers, Tilman, 1989. "Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 218-227, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:47:y:1989:i:1:p:218-227

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2013. "Long Term Competition -- A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 627-640, November.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    4. Sergiu Hart, 1985. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(1), pages 117-153, February.
    5. repec:cor:louvrp:-636 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Jean-Pierre Ponssard & Sylvain Sorin, 1981. "Optimal Strategies in zero sum games with almost perfect information," Post-Print hal-00363923, HAL.
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games," Discussion Papers 68, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    2. Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew & Samuelson, Larry, 2005. "Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 126-140, October.
    3. John Duggan, 2011. "Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria," Wallis Working Papers WP62, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
    4. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, epsilon-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games," Game Theory and Information 0402002, EconWPA.
    5. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "On Games of Perfect Information: Equilibria, E-Equilibria and Approximation by Simple Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp427, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    6. Carmona, Guilherme, 2006. "Two Simple Proofs of a Theorem by Harris," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp486, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.

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