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On non-existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium

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  • Livshits, Igor

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  • Livshits, Igor, 2002. "On non-existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 393-396, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:76:y:2002:i:3:p:393-396
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine.
    2. Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games," Discussion Papers 68, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    4. Francis Bloch & Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2011. "Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 263-280, May.
    5. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.

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