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Citations for "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering"

by Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles

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  1. Ichiro Obara, . "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," UCLA Economics Online Papers 374, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  3. Kim, Doyoung, 2006. "Capital budgeting for new projects: On the role of auditing in information acquisition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 257-270, September.
  4. James Malcomson, 2004. "Principal and Expert Agent," Economics Series Working Papers 193, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2012. "Vertical Integration and Costly Demand Information in Regulated Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 249-271, June.
  6. Shi, Xianwen, 2012. "Optimal auctions with information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 666-686.
  7. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 44240, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," MPRA Paper 41966, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Manuel Willington, 2004. "Pre-Contractual Information Acquisition," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv154, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  10. Jacques Crémer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Zheng, 2009. "Auctions with costly information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 41-72, January.
  11. Dang, Tri Vi, 2008. "Bargaining with endogenous information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 339-354, May.
  12. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2014. "Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 485-496.
  13. Hori, Kazumi, 2008. "The role of private benefits in information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 626-631, December.
  14. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
  15. Cremer, J. & Khalil, F & Rochet, J.-C., 1996. "Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered," Papers 976.425, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  16. Terstiege, Stefan, 2012. "Endogenous information and stochastic contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 535-547.
  17. Kim, Doyoung, 2013. "Delegation of information verification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 488-500.
  18. Michi NISHIHARA & Takashi SHIBATA, 2010. "The effects of costly exploration on optimal investment timing," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 10-27, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  19. Jacques Cremer & Yossi Spiegel & Charles Z. Zheng, 2004. "Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 1420, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  20. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  21. Pereira, Samuel C.A., 2009. "Ignorance in a multi-agent setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 264-266, December.
  22. Doh Shin Jeon, . "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006.
  23. Terstiege, Stefan, 2013. "Precontractual Investigation and Sequential Screening," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 429, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Dino Gerardi & Lucas Maestri, 2009. "A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 115, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  26. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
  27. Stefan Terstiege, 2011. "Randomization in contracts with endogenous information," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse07_2011, University of Bonn, Germany.
  28. Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
  29. Stroffolini, Francesca, 2012. "Access profit-sharing regulation with information acquisition and transmission," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 161-174.
  30. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2007. "Information Acquisition and Refunds for Returns," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 54, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  31. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
  32. Steven A. Matthews & Nicola Persico, 2005. "Information Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  33. Elisabetta Iossa & Francesca Stroffolini, 2007. "Integration and Separation with Costly Demand Information," CSEF Working Papers 170, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  34. Pancs, Romans, 2013. "Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 522-543.
  35. Laux, Volker, 2008. "On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 625-635, March.
  36. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Oct 2012.
  37. Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2013. "Innovation and waste in supply chain management," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 191-199.
  38. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  39. Goeschl, Timo & Lin, Tun, 2004. "Endogenous Information Structures in Conservation Contracting," Staff Paper Series 479, University of Wisconsin, Agricultural and Applied Economics.
  40. Dezso Szalay, 2006. "Contracts with Endogenous Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 780, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  41. Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2013. "Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  42. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June.
  43. Hagedorn, Marcus, 2009. "The value of information for auctioneers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 2197-2208, September.
  44. Compte, Olivier & Jehiel, Philippe, 2008. "Gathering information before signing a contract: A screening perspective," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 206-212, January.
  45. Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 118-141.
  46. Hoppe, Eva I., 2013. "Observability of information gathering in agency models," MPRA Paper 43647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  47. Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2005. "Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 217-230, March.
  48. Moscarini, Giuseppe & Ottaviani, Marco, 2001. "Price Competition for an Informed Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 457-493, December.
  49. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
  50. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Hori, Kazumi, 2006. "The Bright Side of Private Benefits," Discussion Papers 2006-01, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  52. Francesca Stroffolini, 2008. "Access Price Cap Mechanisms and Industry Structure with Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 193, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  53. Pereira, Samuel C.A. & Sousa, Paulo S.A., 2008. "Uncertainty and information accuracy in adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 321-325, September.
  54. Iossa, Elisabetta & Stroffolini, Francesca, 2002. "Price cap regulation and information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1013-1036, September.
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