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Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
  2. Dequiedt, V. & Martimort, D., 2007. "Mechanism design with private communication," Working Papers 200702, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  3. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 1-23.
  4. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 682-694.
  5. repec:gam:jgames:v:8:y:2017:i:4:p:47-:d:117286 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1770-1795.
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 86-99.
  8. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2007. "Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 382-413.
  9. V.V. Bhaskar, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," 2007 Meeting Papers 136, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  10. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2007. "Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games," 2007 Meeting Papers 253, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Edward C. Prescott, 2006. "The Transformation of Macroeconomic Policy and Research," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 50(1), pages 3-20, March.
  13. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 136-160.
  14. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
  15. Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2007. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," 2007 Meeting Papers 751, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  16. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
  17. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 651-669.
  19. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 402-420.
  20. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 802-824.
  21. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, pages 188-201.
  22. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg & Mark L. J. Wright, 2007. "Establishment Size Dynamics in the Aggregate Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1639-1666.
  23. Joyee Deb, 2012. "Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, pages 301-338.
  24. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  25. Takahashi, Satoru, 2010. "Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 42-62.
  26. Samantha Farmakis-Gamboni & David Prentice, 2007. "Does Reducing Union Bargaining Power Increase Productivity?," Working Papers 2007.04 EDIRC Provider-In, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  27. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 711-737.
  28. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, pages 319-350.
  29. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 311-340.
  30. Yves Breitmoser, 2015. "Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2882-2910.
  31. Seung Han Yoo, 2014. "Learning a Population Distribution," Discussion Paper Series 1401, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  32. George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  33. Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny, 2013. "Markov Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Supermodular Games with Imperfect Private and Public Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, pages 187-206.
  34. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs," KIER Working Papers 597, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  35. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  36. Francesc Dilmé, 2012. "Cooperation in Large Societies," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  37. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Shirking Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.05, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  38. Fong, Kyna & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2007. "Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8vz4q9tr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  39. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  40. Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  41. Josh Cherry & Lones Smith, 2009. "Unattainable Payoffs for Repeated Games of Private Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000284, David K. Levine.
  42. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 971-984.
  43. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, pages 683-688.
  44. George Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  45. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 651-669.
  46. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 192-221.
  47. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 191-212.
  48. Felipe Balmaceda, 2012. "On the Optimality of One-size-fits-all Contracts: The Limited Liability Case," Documentos de Trabajo 291, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  49. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
  50. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 142-161.
  51. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
  52. Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
  53. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1733-1769.
  54. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs under ConditionalIndependence," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-005, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  55. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1891-1928.
  56. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2012. "Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1998-2027.
  57. Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), pages 77-100.
  58. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailathy & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000178, David K. Levine.
  59. Heller, Yuval, 2017. "Instability of belief-free equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 261-286.
  60. Vincenzo Quadrini & Ramon Marimon & Thomas Cooley, 2012. "Risky Investments with Limited Commitment," 2012 Meeting Papers 603, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  61. Damien S Eldridge, 2007. "A Learning Theory of Referrals," Working Papers 2007.06, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  62. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:1:p:77-100 is not listed on IDEAS
  63. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:58:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
  64. Felipe Balmaceda & Juan Esconar, 2013. "Trust in Cohesive Communities," Documentos de Trabajo 295, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  65. Simone Cerreia‐Vioglio & David Dillenberger & Pietro Ortoleva, 2015. "Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 693-728, March.
  66. Aiba, Katsuhiko, 2014. "A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 58-66.
  67. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 174-192.
  68. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 682-694.
  69. Yves Breitmoser, 2015. "Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 2882-2910.
  70. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 20 Aug 2007.
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