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Citations for "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom"

by Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen

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  1. Vicente Cuñat & María Guadalupe, 2005. "How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0687, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  2. Li, Donghui & Moshirian, Fariborz & Nguyen, Pascal & Tan, Liwen, 2007. "Corporate governance or globalization: What determines CEO compensation in China?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 32-49, January.
  3. Neubecker, Leslie, 2001. "Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung: Ein Wettbewerbshemmnis im Boom?," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 225, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  4. Lausten, Mette, 2002. "CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 391-414, March.
  5. DiNardo, John & Hallock, Kevin F. & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 2000. "Unions and the Labor Market for Managers," IZA Discussion Papers 150, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Calcagno, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Capital Structure and Managerial Compensation : The Effects of Renumeration Seniority," Discussion Paper 2004-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. P. Geroski, 1998. "An Applied Econometrician's View of Large Company Performance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(3), pages 271-294, June.
  8. Kai A. Konrad, 2002. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CESifo Working Paper Series 698, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Beetsma, Roel & Peters, Hans & Rebers, Eugene, 2000. "When to fire bad managers: the role of collusion between management and board of directors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 427-444, August.
  10. Yishay Yafeh & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 128-146, January.
  11. Paul Gregg & Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, 2005. "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK 1994-2002," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/122, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  12. Neubecker, Leslie, 2002. "Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung bei korrelierter Entwicklung der Marktnachfrage," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 235, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  13. Conyon, Martin J., 1997. "Corporate governance and executive compensation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 493-509, July.
  14. Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter, 2002. "Merger Activity and Executive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 3255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. M. Ali Choudhary & J. Michael Orszag, 2003. "Are Performance Conditions On Executive Options Driven By Fundamentals?," School of Economics Discussion Papers 1103, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  16. Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca, 2014. "Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 989-1017, November.
  17. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January.
  18. Suwina Cheng & Michael Firth, 2006. "Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(7), pages 549-561.
  19. Andreas Kuhn, 2010. "The Public Perception and Normative Valuation of Executive Compensation: An International Comparison," NRN working papers 2010-13, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  20. James Johnston, 2005. "Reward design and CEO succession in the UK," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(13), pages 1535-1541.
  21. Chen-Yu Chang & Hui-Yu Chou & Ming-Teh Wang, 2006. "Characterizing the corporate governance of UK listed construction companies," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(6), pages 647-656.
  22. Phillip McKnight & Cyril Tomkins, 1999. "Top Executive Pay in the United Kingdom: A Corporate Governance Dilemma," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 223-243.
  23. Basu, Sudipta & Hwang, Lee-Seok & Mitsudome, Toshiaki & Weintrop, Joseph, 2007. "Corporate governance, top executive compensation and firm performance in Japan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 56-79, January.
  24. Cazavan-Jeny, Anne & Margaine, Julien & Missonier-Piera, Franck, 2008. "CEO compensations in a stakeholders' regime : an empirical investigation with French listed companies," ESSEC Working Papers DR 08015, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  25. Paul Gregg & Sarah Jewell & Ian Tonks, 2010. "Executive Pay and Performance in the UK," FMG Discussion Papers dp657, Financial Markets Group.
  26. Robert Watson & Nick Wilson, 2005. "Board Pay and the Separation of Ownership from Control in U.K. SMEs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 465-476, 06.
  27. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Athar, Iqbal & Khan, Muhammad Irfan & Ali, Saffar, 2012. "CEO Compensation and Bank Performance," MPRA Paper 42402, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Sep 2012.
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