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Board Pay and the Separation of Ownership from Control in U.K. SMEs

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  • Robert Watson
  • Nick Wilson

Abstract

This paper examines Board pay for a sample of 571 U.K. SMEs from 1991 to 1995. Approximately half of the sample were closely-held (i.e., owner-managed) firms which allowed empirical testing of models of the relationship between Board pay and ownership from control characteristics. Consistent with their need to align shareholder and manager incentives, the results indicate that the change in nonclosely-held SME Board pay is significantly related to both external market pay comparisons and “benchmark” profits. This contrasts with the empirical results for the closely-held firms where Board pay awards are typically highly sensitive to current total profits but wholly unrelated to external market pay levels. Copyright Springer 2005

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  • Robert Watson & Nick Wilson, 2005. "Board Pay and the Separation of Ownership from Control in U.K. SMEs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 465-476, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:24:y:2005:i:5:p:465-476
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-005-6438-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-714, May.
    2. Paul Gregg & Stephen Machin & Stefan Szymanski, 1993. "The Disappearing Relationship Between Directors' Pay and Corporate Performance," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 31(1), pages 1-9, March.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Barkema, Harry & Geroski, Paul & Schwalbach, Joachim, 1997. "Managerial compensation, strategy and firm performance: an introduction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 413-416, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Komath, Muhammed Aslam Chelery & Doğan, Murat & Sayılır, Özlem, 2023. "Impact of corporate governance and related controversies on the market value of banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Hristos Doucouliagos & Janto Haman & T.D. Stanley, 2012. "Pay for Performance and Corporate Governance Reform," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 670-703, July.
    3. María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez & Isabel Gallego-Álvarez, 2020. "Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(6), pages 1251-1297, December.

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