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Executive Pay And Performance In Portuguese Listed Companies

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  • Alves, Paulo
  • Couto, Eduardo
  • Francisco, Paulo

Abstract

This essay analyses the relationship between corporate governance practices and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) wages from a sample of Portuguese listed companies over the period from 2002-2011. The relationship between CEO total compensation and shareholders return, firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, board of directors and shareholders characteristics is analysed. It is found that firm specific factors accounts for the majority of the variance in total CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5%. It is also found that the CEO characteristics, board of directors’ structures, and shareholders features are related with the CEO pay. The policy implications of these results are then derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Alves, Paulo & Couto, Eduardo & Francisco, Paulo, 2014. "Executive Pay And Performance In Portuguese Listed Companies," MPRA Paper 55189, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:55189
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    2. Manika Kohli, 2017. "How Responsive Executive Compensation is to Corporate Performance? An Indian Perspective," Indian Journal of Commerce and Management Studies, Educational Research Multimedia & Publications,India, vol. 8(2), pages 07-18, May.
    3. Sangyong Han & Hyejeong Mun, 2021. "CEO Compensation in Korea: Is It Different than in the US? A Comparison between Korean Non-Life Insurance Firms and US Property-Liability Insurance Firms," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-20, November.
    4. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    5. Manika Kohli, 2018. "Impact of Ownership Type and Board Characteristics on the Pay–Performance Relationship: Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(1), pages 1-34, June.
    6. Belanès, Amel & Saihi, Malek, 2016. "Evidence on complementarity and substitution contingency in monitoring and bonding mechanisms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 161-171.
    7. Reon Matemane & Tankiso Moloi & Michael Adelowotan, 2022. "Appraising Executive Compensation ESG-Based Indicators Using Analytical Hierarchical Process and Delphi Techniques," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 15(10), pages 1-19, October.
    8. Luciano Rossoni & Cezar Eduardo Aranha & Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva, 2018. "Does the capital of social capital matter? Relational resources of the board and the performance of Brazilian companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(1), pages 153-185, March.
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    10. Sorin-Romulus Berinde & Laura-Maria Herța, 2021. "Performance Improvements for Romanian SMEs and Their Predictors," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(15), pages 1-13, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pay; performance; CEO; corporate governance; listed companies; Portugal;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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