IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/glodps/496.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What Do Employers' Associations Do?

Author

Listed:
  • Martins, Pedro S.

Abstract

While trade unions have been studied in detail, there is virtually no economics research on employer associations (EAs), trade unions' counterparts in many countries. However, besides conducting collective bargaining, EAs perform several other activities that can in uence economic outcomes, including training and coordination. This paper studies the contributions of EAs by comparing affiliated and non-affiliated firms in terms of sales, employment, productivity, and wages. Using matched employer-employee panel data for Portugal, we find that affiliated firms exhibit better outcomes along most of these dimensions, even when drawing on changes in affiliation status over time; and that this affiliation premium tends to increase with EA coverage (defined as the percentage of workers in the relevant industry/region domain that are employed by affiliated firms). Sectors as a whole also appear to benefit from EA coverage, even if non-affiliated firms do worse.

Suggested Citation

  • Martins, Pedro S., 2020. "What Do Employers' Associations Do?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 496, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:496
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214872/1/GLO-DP-0496.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John T. Addison & Pedro Portugal & Hugo Vilares, 2017. "Unions and Collective Bargaining in the Wake of the Great Recession: Evidence from Portugal," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 55(3), pages 551-576, September.
    2. Pedro S. Martins, 2018. "Making their own weather? Estimating employer labour-market power and its wage effects," Working Papers 95, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    3. David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi & Salvatore Modica, 2019. "Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001489, David K. Levine.
    4. Martins, Pedro S. & Saraiva, Joana, 2020. "Assessing the legal value added of collective bargaining agreements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. Martins, Pedro S., 2014. "30,000 Minimum Wages: The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining Extensions," IZA Discussion Papers 8540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Martin Behrens & Markus Helfen, 2016. "The Foundations of Social Partnership," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 54(2), pages 334-357, June.
    7. Alan B. Krueger & Orley Ashenfelter, 2017. "Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector," Working Papers 614, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    8. Pedro Silva Martins, 2019. "The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 591-622, October.
    9. Haucap, Justus & Pauly, Uwe & Wey, Christian, 2001. "Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 287-307, September.
    10. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    11. Alison J. Kirby, 1988. "Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 138-146, Spring.
    12. Alexander Hijzen & Pedro S. Martins, 2016. "No Extension without Representation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Collective Bargaining," IMF Working Papers 2016/143, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
    14. Martins, Pedro S., 2020. "Employee Training and Firm Performance: Quasi-experimental evidence from the European Social Fund," GLO Discussion Paper Series 488, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    15. Ana Rute Cardoso & Pedro Portugal, 2005. "Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under Different Bargaining Settings," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(4), pages 875-902, October.
    16. Oliver E. Williamson, 1968. "Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 85-116.
    17. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martins, Pedro S. & Saraiva, Joana, 2020. "Assessing the legal value added of collective bargaining agreements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pedro S. Martins, 2014. "30,000 minimum wages: the economic effects of collective bargaining extensions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp589, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    2. Martínez Matute, Marta & Martins, Pedro S., 2020. "How representative are social partners in Europe? The role of dissimilarity," GLO Discussion Paper Series 718, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Pedro Silva Martins, 2019. "The Microeconomic Impacts of Employee Representatives: Evidence from Membership Thresholds," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 591-622, October.
    4. Andrea Garnero & François Rycx & Isabelle Terraz, 2020. "Productivity and Wage Effects of Firm‐Level Collective Agreements: Evidence from Belgian Linked Panel Data," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 58(4), pages 936-972, December.
    5. Ronald Bachmann & Thomas K. Bauer & Hanna Frings, 2014. "Minimum Wages as a Barrier to Entry: Evidence from Germany," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 28(3), pages 338-357, September.
    6. Alexander Hijzen & Pedro S. Martins, 2016. "No Extension without Representation? Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Collective Bargaining," IMF Working Papers 2016/143, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Fernando Martins & Paulo Guimarães & Pedro Portugal, 2017. "Upward Nominal Wage Rigidity," Working Papers w201702, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    8. Denis Fougere & Erwan Gautier & Sébastien Roux, 2016. "Understanding Wage Floor Setting in Industry-Level Agreements: Evidence from France," Sciences Po publications 10290, Sciences Po.
    9. Martins, Pedro S. & Saraiva, Joana, 2020. "Assessing the legal value added of collective bargaining agreements," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    10. Effrosyni Adamopoulou & Ernesto Villanueva, 2020. "Wage determination and the bite of collective contracts in Italy and Spain: evidence from the metal working industry," Working Papers 2036, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    11. E. Gautier & D. Fougère & S. Roux, 2016. "The Impact of the National Minimum Wage on Industry-Level Wage Bargaining in France," Working papers 587, Banque de France.
    12. Wenjing Duan & Pedro S. Martins, 2018. "Rent sharing in China: Magnitude, heterogeneity and drivers," Working Papers 96, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
    13. repec:zbw:rwirep:0329 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hartog, Joop & Raposo, Pedro, 2017. "Are starting wages reduced by an insurance premium for preventing wage decline? Testing the prediction of Harris and Holmstrom (1982)," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 105-119.
    15. Ernesto Villanueva, 2015. "Employment and wage effects of extending collective bargaining agreements," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 136-136, March.
    16. Martins, Pedro S., 2016. "Should the Maximum Duration of Fixed-Term Contracts Increase in Recessions? Evidence from a Law Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 10206, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Pedro S. Martins, 2016. "Can overtime premium flexibility promote employment? Firm-and worker-level evidence from a labour law reform," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp607, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
    18. Martins, Pedro S., 2017. "Economic effects of overtime premium flexibility: Firm- and worker-level evidence from a law reform," GLO Discussion Paper Series 102, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    19. Gilles, Robert P. & Lazarova, Emiliya A. & Ruys, Pieter H.M., 2015. "Stability in a network economy: The role of institutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 375-399.
    20. Bernardo Fanfani, 2019. "The Employment Effects of Collective Bargaining," Working papers 064, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
    21. Staab, Manuel, 2019. "The Formation of Social Groups under Status Concern," MPRA Paper 97114, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employer Organisations; Productivity; Social Dialogue; Collective Bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:496. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/glaboea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.