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Medieval matching markets

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  • Börner, Lars
  • Quint, Daniel

Abstract

This paper studies the market microstructure of pre-industrial Europe. In particular we investigate the institution of the broker in markets and fairs, and develop a unique data set of approximately 1100 sets of brokerage rules in 42 merchant towns in Central and Western Europe from the late 13th to the end of the 17th century. We show that towns implemented brokerage as an efficient matchmaking institution in a two-sided market problem. Furthermore, towns differentiated seller-friendly from buyer-friendlier matching mechanisms. We show that the decision to implement matchmaking mechanisms, and whether these mechanisms would be buyer- or seller friendly, depends on the products in question and the stated policy goals of the town, as well as time and geographic variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Börner, Lars & Quint, Daniel, 2010. "Medieval matching markets," Discussion Papers 2010/31, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Designing matching mechanisms in medieval times
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-03-09 23:09:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Davide Cantoni & Noam Yuchtman, 2014. "Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(2), pages 823-887.
    2. Greif, Avner & Tabellini, Guido, 2017. "The clan and the corporation: Sustaining cooperation in China and Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 1-35.
    3. Avner Greif & Guido Tabellini, 2012. "The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe," Working Papers 445, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. van Bochove, Christiaan & Boerner, Lars & Quint, Daniel, 2012. "Anglo-Dutch premium auctions in eighteenth-century Amsterdam," Discussion Papers 2012/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    preindustrial markets; market microstructure; efficient matching;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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