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Medieval market making brokerage regulations in Central Western Europe, ca. 1250-1700

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  • Boerner, Lars

Abstract

This paper examines brokerage regulations in Central and Western Europe from approximately 1250 to 1700. Based on a sample of 70 cities with more than 1609 sets of regulations, we find that brokerage was a multifunctional institution, which served matchmaking, quality certification, and tax collection functions, mainly in product wholesale markets but also in finance and real estate markets. We argue that the implementation of regulations for matchmaking and certification solved incentive problems related to asymmetric information between buyers and sellers, consequently improving the allocation process and fostering trade. In line with these results, we find that most brokerage regulations occur along trade routes and in merchant towns.

Suggested Citation

  • Boerner, Lars, 2016. "Medieval market making brokerage regulations in Central Western Europe, ca. 1250-1700," Economic History Working Papers 66834, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:wpaper:66834
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Brokerage; urban economic policy; allocation mechanisms; pre-modern trade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N73 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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