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Dynamic Price Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann

    () (Yale University, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics (Box 8268))

  • Juuso Valimaki

    () (Helsinki School of Economics & Business Administration)

Abstract

We consider the model of price competition for a single buyer among many sellers in a dynamic environment. The surplus from each trade is allowed to depend on the path of previous purchases, and as a result, the model captures phenomena such as learning by doing and habit formation in consumption characterize Markovian equilibria for finite and infinite horizon versions of the model and show that the stationary infinite horizon version of the model possesses an equilibrium where all the sellers receive an equilibrium payoff equal to their marginal contribution to the social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2004. "Dynamic Price Competition," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm360, Yale School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm360
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1125-1149, September.
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2003. "Dynamic common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 23-48, July.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    4. Miller, Robert A, 1984. "Job Matching and Occupational Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 1086-1120, December.
    5. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 191-219, October.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hackl, Franz & Kummer, Michael E. & Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf & Zulehner, Christine, 2014. "Market structure and market performance in E-commerce," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 199-218.
    2. Said, Maher, 2012. "Auctions with dynamic populations: Efficiency and revenue maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2419-2438.
    3. Chen, Yuxin & Zhang, Z. John, 2009. "Dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 43-50, January.
    4. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Competing Mechanisms with Limited Commitment," CESifo Working Paper Series 6280, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Carlos J.Pérez & Carlos J.Ponce, 2013. "Disruption costs and the choice of technology," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv292, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
    6. Yaroslav Kryukov & Ulrich Doraszelski & David Besanko, 2015. "Is Dynamic Competition Socially Beneficial? The Case of Price as Investment," 2015 Meeting Papers 296, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Bhaskar, Venkataraman, 2013. "Dynamic Countervailing Power under Public and Private Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 9526, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic Competition; Marginal Contribution; Markov Perfect Equilibrium; Common Agency;

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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