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Macroeconomic Effects of Sectoral Shocks in Germany, the U.K. and, the U.S

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Listed:
  • Erik Hernæs
  • Zhiyang Jia
  • Steinar Strøm

Abstract

Models for non-cooperative as well as cooperative behavior of families are estimated on data from Norway from 1994 to 1998. The models aim at explaining labor supply behavior of married couples the first five months after the husband becomes eligible for early retirement, while the wife is not eligible. Estimates and predictions derived from the different models are compared. Econometric tests find that the Stackelberg model with the male as the leader is the best. Simulations with the estimated models show that taxing pension income the same way as labor income would reduce the propensity to retire early considerably.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik Hernæs & Zhiyang Jia & Steinar Strøm, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects of Sectoral Shocks in Germany, the U.K. and, the U.S," CHILD Working Papers wp04_03, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp04_03
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    File URL: http://www.child.carloalberto.org/images/wp/child04_2003.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    family labor supply; retirement; econometric models; policy simulations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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