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Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the Retirement Equity Act

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  • Aura, Saku

Abstract

This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions both from a simple Nash-bargaining model of the household and from the classical single-utility-function model of the household. This law change gave spouses of married pension-plan participants the right to survivor benefits unless they explicitly waived this right. The predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model in the data.
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  • Aura, Saku, 2005. "Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the Retirement Equity Act," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1699-1717, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:89:y:2005:i:9-10:p:1699-1717
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    Cited by:

    1. Molina, José Alberto & Gimenez-Nadal, J. Ignacio & Velilla, Jorge, 2018. "Intertemporal Labor Supply: A Household Collective Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 11276, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Beshears, John & Choi, James J. & Laibson, David & Madrian, Brigitte C., 2011. "Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 315-336, April.
    3. Rundshagen, Bianca, 2013. "Mediation - Boon or Bane for the Stability and Efficiency of Marriage?," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79840, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Nino Abashidze & Robert L. Clark & Beth Ritter & David Vanderweide, 2018. "Annuity Pricing in Public Pension Plans: Importance of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 25343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Edwin Wong, 2015. "Marital bargaining in the demand for life insurance: evidence from the Health and Retirement Study," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 243-268, June.
    6. Willaim G. Gale & Karen M. Pence, 2006. "Are Successive Generations Getting Wealthier, and If So, Why?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 37(1), pages 155-234.
    7. Saku Aura, 2002. "Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining," CESifo Working Paper Series 801, CESifo.
    8. Clark, Robert L. & Hammond, Robert G. & Vanderweide, David, 2019. "Navigating complex financial decisions at retirement: evidence from annuity choices in public sector pensions," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 594-611, October.
    9. Beshears, John & Choi, James J. & Laibson, David & Madrian, Brigitte C., 2008. "How are preferences revealed?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(8-9), pages 1787-1794, August.
    10. Gale, William & Pence, Karen, 2006. "Are Successive Generations Getting Wealthier, and If So, Why?Evidence from the 1990s," MPRA Paper 55502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Jon Strand, 2005. "Individual and Household Values of Mortality Reductions with Intrahousehold Bargaining," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 217-236, September.
    12. Jeffrey R. Brown & Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan & Marian V. Wrobel, 2013. "Framing Lifetime Income," NBER Working Papers 19063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Jeffrey R. Brown, 2007. "Rational and Behavioral Perspectives on the Role of Annuities in Retirement Planning," NBER Working Papers 13537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Saku Aura, 2002. "Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining," Working Papers 0217, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    15. Agarwal, Sumit & Green, Richard & Rosenblatt, Eric & Yao, Vincent W. & Zhang, Jian, 2018. "Gender difference and intra-household economic power in mortgage signing order," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 86-100.
    16. Jon Strand, 2007. "Public-good valuation and intra-family allocation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(4), pages 527-543, December.
    17. John Beshears & James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2009. "The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving Outcomes: Evidence from the United States," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, pages 167-195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Brighita Negrusa & Sonia Oreffice, 2011. "Sexual orientation and household financial decisions: evidence from couples in the United States," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 445-463, December.
    19. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Denni Tommasi, 2016. "Household Responses to cash Transfers," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2016-20, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    21. Jon Strand, 2004. "Public-Good Valuation and Intrafamily Allocation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1351, CESifo.
    22. Lundberg, Shelly & Startza, Richard & Stillman, Steven, 2003. "The retirement-consumption puzzle: a marital bargaining approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1199-1218, May.
    23. Maurizio Mazzocco & Claudia Ruiz & Shintaro Yamaguchi, 2014. "Labor Supply and Household Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 354-359, May.
    24. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru & Ogawa, Yoshitomo, 2019. "Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 384-393.
    25. Komura, Mizuki & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2014. "Pension and the Family," IZA Discussion Papers 8479, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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