Retirement in Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Families
Models for non-cooperative as well as cooperative behavior of families are estimated on data from Norway from 1994 to 1998. The models aim at explaining labor supply behavior of married couples the first five months after the husband becomes eligible for early retirement, while the wife is not eligible. Estimates and predictions derived from the different models are compared. Econometric tests find that the Stackelberg model with the male as the leader is the best. Simulations with the estimated models show that taxing pension income the same way as labor income would reduce the propensity to retire early considerably.
|Date of creation:||11 Dec 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway|
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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