Globalization, Inequality, and Corruption
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalization and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995-2005 point to three main results: i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital, and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption. ii) Globalization (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries. iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalization on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalization – besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing inequality.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
|Date of revision:|
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Web page: http://www.wu.ac.at/economics/en
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sambit Bhattacharyya & Roland Hodler, 2008. "Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption," OxCarre Working Papers 020, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
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