Financial sector inefficiencies and coordination failures : implications for crisis management
The authors analyze the implications for crisis management of inefficient financial intermediation in a country (such as Indonesia or the Republic of Korea) where firms are highly indebted. They base their analysis on a model in which firms rely on bank credit to finance their working capital needs and loan contracts entail high state verification and enforcement costs for lenders. They find that higher volatility of output, lower productivity, or higher costs for contract enforcement and verification may shift the economy to the inefficient portion of the debt Laffer curve - with potentially sizable losses in employment and output. What implications does this have for the policy debate on crisis management in East Asia? Debt reduction, in addition to debt rescheduling, may be required to reduce employment and output losses in the presence of inefficiencies in the financial sector. In practice this may be difficult to coordinate among a large group of creditors because of the free-riding problem: Each creditor has an incentive to refrain from offering debt relief on its own claims and wait for others to do so, thereby raising the expected value of its own claims.
|Date of creation:||30 Sep 1999|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433|
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Pierre-Richard AgÃ©nor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998.
"Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 207-235, June.
- Joshua Aizenman & Pierre-Richard AgÃ©nor, 1997. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," IMF Working Papers 97/127, International Monetary Fund.
- Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1997. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 6080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Helpman, Elhanan, 1989.
"The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 440-51, June.
- Elhanan Helpman, 1989.
"Voluntary Debt Reduction: Incentives and Welfare,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(3), pages 580-611, September.
- Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, March.
- Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, March.
- Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2185. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.