Investment and deposit contracts under costly intermediation and aggregate volatility
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Agenor, Pierre-Richard, 2001.
"Benefits and costs of international financial integration : theory and facts,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2699, The World Bank.
- Pierre-Richard AgÈnor, 2003. "Benefits and Costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(8), pages 1089-1118, 08.
- Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
- Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
- Joshua Aizenman & Pierre-Richard AgÃ©nor, 1997.
"Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets,"
IMF Working Papers
- Pierre-Richard AgÃ©nor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 207-235, June.
- Pierre-Richard Agenor & Joshua Aizenman, 1997. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 6080, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
- Boyd, John H & Smith, Bruce D, 1994. "How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(4), pages 539-561, October.
- Martin F. Hellwig, 2000.
"Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 719-742.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 98-39, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Hellwig, Martin, 1998. "Financial intermediation with risk aversion," Papers 98-39, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Townsend, Robert M., 1979.
"Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
- Robert M. Townsend, 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Staff Report 45, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, September.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Chang, Chun, 1990. "The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 68-86, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:15:y:2006:i:3:p:263-275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.