IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2842.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial sector inefficiencies and the debt Laffer curve

Author

Listed:
  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard
  • Aizenman, Joshua

Abstract

The authors analyze the implications of inefficient financial intermediation for dbt management, using a model in which firms rely on bank credit to finance their working capital needs, and, lenders face a high state verification and enforcement costs of loan contracts. Their analysis shows that lower expected productivity, higher contract enforcement, and verification costs, or higher volatility of productivity shocks may shift the economy to the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, with potentially sizable output, and welfare losses. The main implication of this analysis is that debt relief may generate little welfare gains, unless is accompanied by reforms aimed at reducing financial sector inefficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Agenor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 2002. "Financial sector inefficiencies and the debt Laffer curve," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2842, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2842
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/06/12/000094946_02052504054864/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierre-Richard Agénor & Joshua Aizenman, 1998. "Contagion and Volatility with Imperfect Credit Markets," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 207-235, June.
    2. Joshua Aizenman & Nancy P. Marion, 1999. "Uncertainty and the disappearance of international credit," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    3. Helpman, Elhanan, 1989. "The Simple Analytics of Debt-Equity Swaps," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 440-451, June.
    4. Krugman, Paul, 1988. "Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 253-268, November.
    5. P.R. Agenor & J. Aizenman & A. Hoffmaister, 1998. "Contagion, Bank Lending Spreads and Output Fluctuations," NBER Working Papers 6850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Agénor, Pierre-Richard & Aizenman, Joshua, 2011. "Capital market imperfections and the theory of optimum currency areas," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, pages 1659-1675.
    2. Guler Aras & Lale Aslan, 2011. "Capital structure and credit risk management: evidence from Turkey," International Journal of Accounting and Finance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 3(1), pages 1-20.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks&Banking Reform; Economic Theory&Research; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Environmental Economics&Policies; Strategic Debt Management; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform; Environmental Economics&Policies; Financial Intermediation; Strategic Debt Management;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2842. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dvewbus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.