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International institutional lending arrangements to sovereign borrowers

  • Plaut, Steven E.
  • Melnik, Arie L.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Money and Finance.

Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 459-481

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:22:y:2003:i:4:p:459-481
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30443

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  1. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, pages 225-236 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, 1989. "How Sovereign Debt Has Worked," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 39-106 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1991. "Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks: Intermediation as credibility assurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 605-632, June.
  3. Kamin, Steven B., 1999. "The current international financial crisis:: how much is new?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 501-514, August.
  4. Martin, J. Spencer & Santomero, Anthony M., 1997. "Investment opportunities and corporate demand for lines of credit," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1331-1350, October.
  5. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
  6. Robert B. Avery & Allen N. Berger, 1990. "Loan commitments and bank risk exposure," Working Paper 9015, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  7. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Why is there Multilateral Lending?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International Bailouts, Moral Hazard, and Conditionality," CESifo Working Paper Series 563, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Holmstrom, B & Tirole, J, 1996. "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Working papers 96-21, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Bordo, Michael D. & Schwartz, Anna J., 1999. "Under what circumstances, past and present, have international rescues of countries in financial distress been successful?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 683-708, August.
  11. Eaton, Jonathan, 1992. "Sovereign debt : a primer," Policy Research Working Paper Series 855, The World Bank.
  12. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1999. "Limited commitment and central bank lending," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 1-27.
  14. Kenen, Peter B, 1990. "Organizing Debt Relief: The Need for a New Institution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 7-18, Winter.
  15. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Cleaning Up Third World Debt without Getting Taken to the Cleaners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 31-42, Winter.
  16. Anne O. Krueger, 1997. "Whither the World Bank and the IMF?," NBER Working Papers 6327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, Jacob, 1993. "New money and adjustment policies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 177-190.
  18. Berkovitch, Elazar & Greenbaum, Stuart I., 1991. "The Loan Commitment as an Optimal Financing Contract," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(01), pages 83-95, March.
  19. Melnik, Arie & Plaut, Steven E., 1986. "The economics of loan commitment contracts: Credit pricing and utilization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 267-280, June.
  20. Anjan V. Thakor & Gregory F. Udell, 2004. "An Economic Rationale for the Pricing Structure of Bank Loan Commitments," Finance 0411053, EconWPA.
  21. Paul R. Krugman, 1989. "Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, pages 285-298 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Eaton, Jonathan, 1990. "Debt Relief and the International Enforcement of Loan Contracts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 43-56, Winter.
  23. Steven B. Kamin, 1999. "The current international financial crisis: how much is new?," International Finance Discussion Papers 636, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  24. Cole, Harold L & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1998. "Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, February.
  25. Paul R. Krugman, 1988. "Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang," NBER Working Papers 2486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Ham, John C & Melnik, Arie, 1987. "Loan Demand: An Empirical Analysis Using Micro Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 704-09, November.
  27. Campbell, Tim S, 1978. "A Model of the Market for Lines of Credit," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 231-44, March.
  28. Melnik, Arie & Plaut, Steven, 1986. " Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and Credit Allocation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 425-35, June.
  29. Shockley Richard L., 1995. "Bank Loan Commitments and Corporate Leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 272-301, July.
  30. Dani Rodrik & Andres Velasco, 1999. "Short-Term Capital Flows," NBER Working Papers 7364, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Yoon, Suk Heun, 1993. "Loan commitments, investment decisions and the signalling equilibrium," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 645-661, June.
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