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Can HIPCs Use Hyper-Incentives?

  • Menzies, Gordon Douglas

Hyper-incentive contracts (Menzies 2004) can be used to pursue humanitarian goals (providing a safety net) while allowing creditors to offer innovative repayment friendly contracts to debtors (eliminating a debt overhang). Both the contract of Krugman (1988) and the hyper-incentive contract are illustrated with some calculations based on current Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The outcomes for the two contracts are similar, but the twelve countries examined could each benefit by an average amount of $US2002100 million under a hyper-incentive contract

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50012
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Article provided by Review of Applied Economics in its journal Review of Applied Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1-2 ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:ags:reapec:50012
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.lincoln.ac.nz/story11874.html

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  1. Eaton, Jonathan, 1992. "Sovereign debt : a primer," Policy Research Working Paper Series 855, The World Bank.
  2. Krugman, Paul, 1988. "Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 253-268, November.
  3. Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell'Aricca, 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 68-86.
  4. Fernandez-Ruiz, Jorge, 1996. "Debt and incentives in a dynamic context," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 139-151, August.
  5. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Tito Cordella, 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs," IMF Working Papers 02/115, International Monetary Fund.
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