Can HIPCs Use Hyper-Incentives?
Hyper-incentive contracts (Menzies 2004) can be used to pursue humanitarian goals (providing a safety net) while allowing creditors to offer innovative repayment friendly contracts to debtors (eliminating a debt overhang). Both the contract of Krugman (1988) and the hyper-incentive contract are illustrated with some calculations based on current Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The outcomes for the two contracts are similar, but the twelve countries examined could each benefit by an average amount of $US2002100 million under a hyper-incentive contract
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eaton, Jonathan, 1992.
"Sovereign debt : a primer,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
855, The World Bank.
- Jonathan Eaton, 1991. "Sovereign Debt: A Primer," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 21, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Fernandez-Ruiz, Jorge, 1996. "Debt and incentives in a dynamic context," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 139-151, August.
- Tito Cordella & Giovanni Dell'Aricca, 2002.
"Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs,"
IMF Staff Papers,
Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(Special i), pages 68-86.
- Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Tito Cordella, 2002. "Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs," IMF Working Papers 02/115, International Monetary Fund.
- Paul R. Krugman, 1988.
"Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang,"
NBER Working Papers
2486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:reapec:50012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.