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Loan commitments and bank risk exposure

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  • Robert B. Avery
  • Allen N. Berger

Abstract

Loan commitments increase a bank's risk by obligating it to issue future loans under terms that it might otherwise refuse. However, moral hazard and adverse selection problems potentially may result in these contracts being rationed or sorted. Depending on the relative risks of the borrowers who do and do not receive commitments, commitment loans could be safer or riskier on average than other loans. the empirical results indicate that commitment loans tend to have slightly better than average performance, suggesting that commitments generate little risk or that this risk is offset by the selection of safer borrowers.
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Suggested Citation

  • Robert B. Avery & Allen N. Berger, 1989. "Loan commitments and bank risk exposure," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 65, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:65
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ham, John C & Melnik, Arie, 1987. "Loan Demand: An Empirical Analysis Using Micro Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 704-709, November.
    2. Avery, Robert B. & Berger, Allen N., 1991. "Loan commitments and bank risk exposure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 173-192, February.
    3. Boot, Arnoud & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 449-471, September.
    4. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1991. "Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks: Intermediation as credibility assurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 605-632, June.
    5. Sofianos, George & Wachtel, Paul & Melnik, Arie, 1990. "Loan commitments and monetary policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 677-689, October.
    6. Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987. "An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
    7. Gary D. Koppenhaver, 1987. "The effects of regulation on bank participation in the guarantee market," Staff Memoranda 87-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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    Keywords

    Risk; Bank loans;

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