IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/usi/wpaper/483.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Employee Participation and Wages: An Empirical Investigation with Selectivity Correction

Author

Listed:
  • Tushar Kanti Nandi

    ()

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between employee participation in work teams, profit sharing and consultation between employees and management, and wages. It uses matched employeeestablishment data from the British economy. It takes explicit account of selectivity that arises from self-selection of employees into their preferred establishments and selective adoption of participatory practices by employers. The estimates indicate wage premium for the employees who work in establishments with participatory practices. The selectivity appears to be an important factor in the relationship between employee participation and wages. The estimates without selectivity correction suggest a lower wage premium than that suggested by selectivity corrected estimates. The selectivity corrected estimates show that employees in establishment with any one, two or all of the participatory practices earn a wage premium of 18%, 32.7% and 55.1%, respectively. The estimates of the interaction model of participation and education indicate that an extra year of education earns lower wage premium in establishments with participatory practices than in establishments with no participatory practice. This finding suggests that the equalizing effect of employee participation can reduce wage inequality between high and low educated employees

Suggested Citation

  • Tushar Kanti Nandi, 2006. "Employee Participation and Wages: An Empirical Investigation with Selectivity Correction," Department of Economics University of Siena 483, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:483
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/483.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner & Cheri Ostroff, 2000. "The Anatomy of Employee Involvement and Its Effects on Firms and Workers," NBER Working Papers 8050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Reilly, Kevin T, 1996. "Does Union Membership Matter? The Effect of Establishment Union Density on the Union Wage Differential," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(3), pages 547-557, August.
    3. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "A Model of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 117-125, March.
    4. Michael J. Handel & Maury Gittleman, 1999. "Is There a Wage Payoff to Innovative Work Practices?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_288, Levy Economics Institute.
    5. Takao Kato & Motohiro Morishima, 1995. "The Productivity Effects of Human Resource Management Practices: Evidence from New Japanese Panel Data," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_143, Levy Economics Institute.
    6. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
    7. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
    8. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch & Anya Krivelyova, 2003. "How workers fare when employers innovate," Working Paper Series 2003-22, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    9. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, 2001. "How To Compete: The Impact Of Workplace Practices And Information Technology On Productivity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 434-445, August.
    10. Even Caroli & John Van Reenen, 1999. "Organization, skill and technology: evidence from a panel of British and French establishments," IFS Working Papers W99/23, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    11. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 179-208, April.
    13. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    14. McNabb, Robert, 1989. "Compensating Wage Differentials: Some Evidence for Britain," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 327-338, April.
    15. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June.
    16. Handel, Michael J. & Levine, David I., 2006. "The Effects of New Work Practices on Workers," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt2fm3x01d, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    17. Harminder Battu & Clive R. Belfield & Peter J. Sloane, 2003. "Human Capital Spillovers within the Workplace: Evidence for Great Britain," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 65(5), pages 575-594, December.
    18. Peter Cappelli & William H. Carter, 2000. "Computers, Work Organization, and Wage Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 7987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Work teams; Profit sharing; Employee participation; Selectivity; Wage;

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:483. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/desieit.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.