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Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d'inflation

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  • Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim

    () (Galatasaray University Economic Research Center)

Abstract

Le ciblage d’inflation est une politique basée sur l’annonce d’une cible d’inflation et un engagement à respecter à cette cible annoncée par la Banque Centrale et sur une stratégie de communication et de transparence, d’où la cible d’inflation est l’objectif final de la politique monétaire. C’est aussi une politique qui permet de résoudre le problème de la crédibilité. Dans ce travail, on essaye de voir en quoi la politique de ciblage d’inflation consiste à améliorer le degré de la crédibilité. Pour ce faire, à la lumière de la revue de la littérature sur la crédibilité, on montre théoriquement qu’il s’agit d’une politique monétaire qui évite le biais inflationniste et qui combine différentes mesures permettant l’amélioration de la crédibilité.

Suggested Citation

  • Gürbüz Beşek, Yeşim, 2011. "Crédibilité en matière de ciblage d'inflation," GIAM Working Papers 11-1, Galatasaray University Economic Research Center, revised 08 Feb 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:giamwp:2011_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politique monétaire; ciblage d’inflation; crédibilité; jeux non coopératifs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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