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Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank

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  • Alessandro Missale
  • Elisabetta Falcetti

Abstract

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue conventional debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.

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  • Alessandro Missale & Elisabetta Falcetti, "undated". "Public Debt Indexation and Denomination with and Indipendent Central Bank," Working Papers 169, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:169
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    Cited by:

    1. Falcetti, Elisabetta & Missale, Alessandro, 2002. "Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1825-1850, December.
    2. Grobéty, Mathieu, 2018. "Government debt and growth: The role of liquidity," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-22.
    3. Westerhout, Ed, 2021. "Inflation-Linked Bonds, Nominal Bonds, and Countercyclical Monetary Policies," Other publications TiSEM ee384b1f-4e6f-4f30-821e-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Michael Bleaney & F. Gulcin Ozkan, 2008. "Foreign Debt and Fear of Floating: A Theoretical Exploration," Discussion Papers 08/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Giorgio Basevi & Lorenzo Pecchi & Gustavo Piga, 2005. "Parallel Monies, Parallel Debt: Lessons from the EMU and Options for the New EU," CEIS Research Paper 68, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
    6. Alessandro Missale, 2012. "Sovereign debt management and fiscal vulnerabilities," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Threat of fiscal dominance?, volume 65, pages 157-176, Bank for International Settlements.
    7. Martin Melecky, 2012. "Choosing The Currency Structure Of Foreign‐Currency Debt: A Review Of Policy Approaches," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2), pages 133-151, March.
    8. Basil Dalamagas & Stefanos Tantos, 2016. "Optimal Versus Actual Maturity of Government Debt: The Case of Greece," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 66(3), pages 25-52, July-Sept.
    9. Arnaud Mehl & Julien Reynaud, 2008. "Domestic debt structures in emerging markets: new empirical evidence," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla08059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    10. Basil Dalamagas & Stefanos Tantos, 2017. "Optimal Sovereign Debt for an Overdebted Country," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 95-118, June.
    11. Alessandro Missale & Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. "Public Debt Management in Brazil," Development Working Papers 178, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    12. Mehl, Arnaud & Reynaud, Julien, 2010. "Risky public domestic debt composition in emerging economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-18, February.
    13. Michael Bleaney & F. Gulcin Ozkan, 2011. "The structure of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(1), pages 325-339, February.
    14. Kang Yong Tan & Prasanna Gai, 2004. "Good Housekeeping? Reputation, Fixed Exchange Rates, and the 'Original Sin' Problem," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 446, Econometric Society.
    15. World Bank, 2003. "Brazil : Stability for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications - Reports 14881, The World Bank Group.
    16. Nöh, Lukas, 2019. "Increasing public debt and the role of central bank independence for debt maturities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 179-198.
    17. Westerhout, Ed, 2021. "Inflation-Linked Bonds, Nominal Bonds, and Countercyclical Monetary Policies," Discussion Paper 2021-001, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Mehl, Arnaud & Reynaud, Julien, 2005. "The determinants of "domestic" original sin in emerging market economies," Working Paper Series 560, European Central Bank.
    19. Efthimiadis, Tilemahos & Tsintzos, Panagiotis, 2009. "On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy," MPRA Paper 84830, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2009.
    20. Guido Wolswijk & Jakob de Haan, 2005. "Government debt management in the euro area - recent theoretical developments and changes in practices," Occasional Paper Series 25, European Central Bank.

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