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Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM


  • Canzoneri, Matthew B
  • Nolan, Charles
  • Yates, Tony


Canzoneri (1985) and Rogoff (1985) showed that imposing symmetric penalties on a central bank for deviations from an announced inflation target would reduce the Barro-Gordon inflation bias, but only at the expense of distorting the central bank’s stabilization effort. More recently, Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) showed that a simple linear penalty on all observed inflation would eliminate the inflation bias without distorting the stabilization effort. We view this result as a methodological criticism of the Barro-Gordon model, and not a statement about the ease with which the bias can be eliminated. Thus, we begin by modifying the Barro-Gordon model to reintroduce the trade-off between inflation credibility and stabilization, even when linear inflation penalties are imposed. We then discuss how either type of penalty might actually be imposed, and ask whether inflation targeting (supported by one or the other type of penalty) is likely to bring a better resolution to the credibility-stabilization trade-off than the ERM.

Suggested Citation

  • Canzoneri, Matthew B & Nolan, Charles & Yates, Tony, 1996. "Mechanisms for Achieving Monetary Stability: Inflation Targeting Versus the ERM," CEPR Discussion Papers 1418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1418

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    Cited by:

    1. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    2. Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Cristóbal Campoy-Miñarroy, 2004. "Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(1_2), pages 29-39, July.
    3. Falcetti, Elisabetta & Missale, Alessandro, 2002. "Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(10), pages 1825-1850, December.
    4. Haizhou Huang & A. Jorge Padilla, 2002. "Fiscal Policy and the Implementation of the Walsh Contract for Central Bankers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 27-42, May.
    5. Chadha, Jagjit S & Nolan, Charles, 2002. "Inflation and Price Level Targeting in a New Keynesian Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 70(4), pages 570-595, Special I.
    6. Kanas, Angelos, 2005. "Regime linkages in the US/UK real exchange rate-real interest differential relation," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 257-274, March.
    7. Øistein RØisland & Ragnar Torvik, 2003. "Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 99-118, April.
    8. Johannes Groeneveld & Kees Koedijk & Clemens Kool, 1998. "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Strategies: Evidence from Six Industrialized Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 21-38, January.
    9. Chadha, Jagjit S. & Nolan, Charles, 2007. "Optimal simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 665-689, December.
    10. Devine, Máiréad & McCoy, Daniel, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A Review of the Issues," Research Technical Papers 5/RT/97, Central Bank of Ireland.
    11. Walsh, Carl E, 2003. " Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 829-849, October.
    12. Matthew Canzoneri & Behzad Diba, 1999. "The Stability and Growth Pact: A Delicate Balance or an Albatross?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 26(3), pages 241-258, September.
    13. SCHELLEKENS, Philip, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks," Working Papers 1999009, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
    14. Kanas, Angelos & Genius, Margarita, 2005. "Regime (non)stationarity in the US/UK real exchange rate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 407-413, June.
    15. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
    16. Angelos Kanas & Georgios Tsiotas, 2005. "Real interest rates linkages between the USA and the UK in the postwar period," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 251-262.
    17. Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
    18. Muscatelli, V Anton, 1998. "Political Consensus, Uncertain Preferences, and Central Bank Independence," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 412-430, July.
    19. Dai, Meixing, 2006. "Independent inflation-targeting regime versus monetary union: An analysis of dynamic stability under endogenous inflation expectations," MPRA Paper 15142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Kobayashi, Teruyoshi, 2004. "Monetary policy uncertainty and interest rate targeting," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 725-735, December.
    21. Chadha, J.S. & Nolan, C., 2003. "On the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0303, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    22. repec:eee:ecmode:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:484-505 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Inflation Bias; Inflation Targeting;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination


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