IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/qsh/wpaper/316051.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran

Author

Listed:
  • Jamal Ibrahim Haidar

Abstract

I uncover the existence, extent, and mechanism of exports deflection, which followed exports destruction, after the imposition of exports sanctions against Iranian exporters. Using highly dis-aggregated data about Iranian non-oil exports, I show how exporter size, past export status, and pricing strategy matter in the process of exports deflection. The main findings are as follows: (i) two thirds of the value of Iranian non-oil exports thought to be destroyed by exports sanctions have actually been de?ected to destinations not imposing sanctions; (ii) exporters reduced their product prices as they deflected exports to new destinations; (iii) exporters deflected more of their core and homogeneous products; (iv) larger exporters deflected more of their exports than smaller exporters; (v) the new destinations are more politically-friendly with Iran; and (vi) the probability of an exporter to deflect exports to another destination rised if the exporter already existed in that destination, suggesting that cost of exporting matters too. I conclude that exports sanctions may be less effective in a globalized world as exporters can deflect their exports from one export destination to another.

Suggested Citation

  • Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, "undated". "Sanctions and Exports Deflection: Evidence from Iran," Working Paper 316051, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  • Handle: RePEc:qsh:wpaper:316051
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/haidar/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////node/316051
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawless, Martina, 2009. "Firm export dynamics and the geography of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 245-254, April.
    2. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644150.
    3. Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-793, September.
    4. Drezner,Daniel W., 1999. "The Sanctions Paradox," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521643320.
    5. Garth Frazer & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, 2010. "Trade Growth under the African Growth and Opportunity Act," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(1), pages 128-144, February.
    6. Philip I. Levy, 1999. "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 415-420, May.
    7. Carsten Eckel & J. Peter Neary, 2010. "Multi-Product Firms and Flexible Manufacturing in the Global Economy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(1), pages 188-217.
    8. Peter K. Schott, 2004. "Across-Product Versus Within-Product Specialization in International Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 647-678.
    9. Hallak, Juan Carlos, 2006. "Product quality and the direction of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 238-265, January.
    10. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2007. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 176-201, May.
    11. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2007. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (hardcover)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4075, January.
    12. Vannoorenberghe, G., 2012. "Firm-level volatility and exports," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 57-67.
    13. Lance Davis & Stanley Engerman, 2003. "History Lessons: Sanctions - Neither War nor Peace," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 187-197, Spring.
    14. Jonathan Eaton, Marcela Eslava, Maurice Kugler,James Tybout, 1970. "Export Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-Level Evidence," Working Papers eg0036, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 1970.
    15. Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen, 2004. "Why Some Firms Export," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(2), pages 561-569, May.
    16. Rauch, James E., 1999. "Networks versus markets in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 7-35, June.
    17. Eduardo Morales & Gloria Sheu & Andrés Zahler, 2014. "Gravity and Extended Gravity: Using Moment Inequalities to Estimate a Model of Export Entry," NBER Working Papers 19916, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
    19. Margaret P. Doxey, 1980. "Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, edition 0, number 978-1-349-04335-4, December.
    20. Blum, Bernardo S. & Claro, Sebastian & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2013. "Occasional and perennial exporters," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 65-74.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oechslin, Manuel, 2014. "Targeting autocrats: Economic sanctions and regime change," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 24-40.
    2. Anne‐Célia Disdier & Carl Gaigné & Cristina Herghelegiu, 2023. "Do standards improve the quality of traded products?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1238-1290, November.
    3. Meng, Ning & Milner, Chris & Song, Huasheng, 2020. "Antidumping and heterogeneous quality adjustment of multi-product firms: Evidence from Chinese exporters," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 147-161.
    4. Naghavi, Alireza & Pignataro, Giuseppe, 2015. "Theocracy and resilience against economic sanctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-12.
    5. Albornoz, Facundo & Fanelli, Sebastián & Hallak, Juan Carlos, 2016. "Survival in export markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 262-281.
    6. Dizaji, S.F. & Lis, P. & Murshed, S.M. & Zweiri, M., 2020. "What the political economy literature tells us about blockades and sanctions," ISS Working Papers - General Series 130655, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    7. Robert Elliott & Supreeya Virakul, 2010. "Multi-product firms and exporting: a developing country perspective," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(4), pages 635-656, December.
    8. Lili Wang & Yong Zhao, 2013. "Does Experience Facilitate Entry into New Export Destinations?," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 21(5), pages 36-59, September.
    9. Simone Cigna & Philipp Meinen & Patrick Schulte & Nils Steinhoff, 2022. "The impact of US tariffs against China on US imports: Evidence for trade diversion?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(1), pages 162-173, January.
    10. Vandenbussche, Hylke & Aw-Roberts, Bee Yan & Lee, Yi, 2018. "Decomposing Firm-Product Appeal: How important is Consumer Taste?," CEPR Discussion Papers 12707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Kirilakha, Aleksandra & Syropoulos, Constantinos & Yalcin, Erdal & Yotov, Yoto V., 2020. "The global sanctions data base," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    12. William Seitz & Alberto Zazzaro, 2020. "Sanctions and public opinion: The case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 817-843, October.
    13. Andrew B. Bernard & J. Bradford Jensen & Stephen J. Redding & Peter K. Schott, 2012. "The Empirics of Firm Heterogeneity and International Trade," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 283-313, July.
    14. Christian Volpe Martincus & Jerónimo Carballo, 2010. "Entering new country and product markets: does export promotion help?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 437-467, September.
    15. Aeberhardt, Romain & Buono, Ines & Fadinger, Harald, 2014. "Learning, incomplete contracts and export dynamics: Theory and evidence from French firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 219-249.
    16. Denise Guthrie & Erick Duchesne, 2003. "(Mis)Selection Effects and Sovereignty Costs: An Alternative Measure of the Costs of Sanctions," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20032, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    17. Christian Volpe Martincus & Jerónimo Carballo, 2012. "Export promotion activities in developing countries: What kind of trade do they promote?," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 539-578, June.
    18. Federico J. Diez & Jesse Mora & Alan C. Spearot, 2016. "Firms in international trade," Working Papers 16-25, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    19. Békés, Gábor & Muraközy, Balázs, 2012. "Temporary trade and heterogeneous firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 232-246.
    20. Valentin L. Krustev & T. Clifton Morgan, 2011. "Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 351-376, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
    • F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qsh:wpaper:316051. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Brandon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cbrssus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.