The Effect of Connectivity, Proximity and Market Structure on R&D Networks
In a seminal paper, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) use an undirected network to characterize knowledge flows between firms engaging in research in an oligopolistic market. In their paper, firms are regarded as inhabiting a research joint venture (RJV), if they share the same edge of the network. These firms are allowed an R&D spillover of 1; the outside firms (firms not sharing an edge in the network) are permitted a constant knowledge spillover that is less than one. We begin our paper by showing that this last assumption has important consequences when dealing with R&D networks of size greater than or equal to six firms. We present examples of topologically non-equivalent networks that have the same degree of connectivity and generate identical outcomes in terms of R&D effort, firm profits and total welfare. We then modify their model so that R&D spillovers decrease as the number of shortest paths increases between any two firms. We show that under product differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition, we have different outcomes for all economic variables. We also show that R&D effort increases with respect to the number of collaborative links if firms are in a weakly competitive market, whereas it declines if firms are in a more competitive market where products are closer substitutes. We also find that in more competitive markets there is a conflict between the stability and the efficiency of RJVs.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +61 7 3365 6570
Fax: +61 7 3365 7299
Web page: http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Competing Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
- Greg Shaffer & Stephen W. Salant, 1999. "Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 585-604, June.
- Darmot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 1997. "Public Policy Towards R & D in Oligopolistic Industry," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 1997(5), pages 683-698.
- Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint Ventures," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 122-137, 06.
- Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1999.
"Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 223-249, 06.
- Rabah Amir & John Wooders, 1998. "Effects of One-way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-20, December.
- Kultti, Klaus & Takalo, Tuomas, 1998. "R&D spillovers and information exchange," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 121-123, October.
- Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
- Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January.
- De Bondt, Raymond, 1997. "Spillovers and innovative activities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-28, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:454. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SOE IT)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.