Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment
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- Sebastian Galiani & Nadya Hajj & Patrick J. McEwan & Pablo Ibarrarán & Nandita Krishnaswamy, 2019. "Voter Response to Peak and End Transfers: Evidence from a Conditional Cash Transfer Experiment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 232-260, August.
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Electoral reciprocity in programmatic redistribution: Experimental Evidence
by maximorossi in NEP-LTV blog on 2016-09-28 23:34:33
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lehmann, M. Christian & Matarazzo, Hellen, 2019. "Voters’ response to in-kind transfers: Quasi-experimental evidence from prescription drug cost-sharing in Brazil," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
More about this item
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2016-09-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2016-09-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2016-09-18 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LTV-2016-09-18 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-POL-2016-09-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2016-09-18 (Sociology of Economics)
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