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Mimicking the Opposition: Bismarck's Welfare State and the Rise of the Socialists

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  • Felix Kersting

    (HU Berlin)

Abstract

This paper examines the consequences of a government mimicking the policy of its competitor by studying the introduction of the welfare state in 19th century Germany. The reform conducted by the conservative government targeted blue-collar workers and aimed to reduce the success of the socialist party. The result based on a difference-in-differences design shows that the socialist party benefited in elections due to the reform. The analysis of the mechanism points to the socialist's issue ownership by strengthening its reform orientation, which voters followed. The results are not driven by other political and economic channels related to the reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Kersting, 2023. "Mimicking the Opposition: Bismarck's Welfare State and the Rise of the Socialists," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 448, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:448
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bauernschuster, Stefan & Hornung, Erik & Koenig, Christoph, 2023. "The Political Effects of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic in Weimar Germany," CEPR Discussion Papers 18277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    5. Khoudour-Castéras, David, 2008. "Welfare State and Labor Mobility: The Impact of Bismarck's Social Legislation on German Emigration before World War I," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 211-243, March.
    6. Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer & Jochen Streb, 2018. "Does Social Security Crowd Out Private Savings? The Case of Bismarck’s System of Social Insurance [Pension Wealth and Household Savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE]," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 22(3), pages 298-321.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    welfare state; socialism; government; opposition; issue ownership; voting behavior; Germany;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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